Steeljaw Scribe

"After its firing from the submarine Dmitry Donskoy, the Bulava missile self-liquidated and exploded into the air" - Russian MoD spokesman to Interfax 23 Dec 08 And thus was written the postscript on the latest test of the star-crossed Bulava SLBM.  Five failures in eight attempts would seem to call into question the fast-track to IOC/deployment of the missile - but given that there is no alternative to speak of (yes, there is the SS-N-23, but it won't fit the launchers on the new SSBNs), it looks like the Russians are stuck with continuing to try and make the Bulava work.  And maybe not so fast on the IOC... The Bulava scenario is pregnant with questions for our own procurement process - e.g., putting all your eggs in one basket and hoping it all works as advertised since you've pinned the future of a platform/capability on the success of that development (*cough*JSF*cough*).  So what happens if we find ourselves in a similar coffin corner with a major program?  Cancel it and hope that in the interim we can stretch out the legacy platform until the (next) new one comes on line?  Been there, done that.  Remember the A-12?  Look what that scenario did to the VA and VF communities and our long-range strike capability in particular and TACAIR in general (still feeling the aftereffects today).  There's a lot of discussion out there right now about the F-35, some legit, some politically motivated, but enough that hope alone isn't COA if it falls short in ... Continue Reading

The jet age doesn't hold a monopoly on goofs, blunders and outright failures where naval aviation is concerned. Indeed, the prop epoch not only had its fair share, but perhaps the posterchild for the genre, the F2A Brewster. Meant to be the Navy's first foray into the carrier-based monoplane field it was instead shunted ashore, passed to the Marines and Allies where it was clearly outclassed by its competition. Yet in one theater it absolutely shined when placed in the hands of the Finnish air force in their defense against Russia. How could that have been the case? We will attempt to answer that and other questions with this issue of Flightdeck Friday. Prelude In the mid-30's, the frontline fighter for the Navy was still a biplane, manufactured by Grumman. The F2F had replaced the Boeing F4B and the improved version - the F3F-1 was slated to begin equipping the fleet in 1937-38. Still, it was clear that the future for fighters lay in an all-metal, monoplane with retracing gear and an enclosed cockpit. At least it seemed so to all but Grumman... In 1935, the Navy issued an RFP for a carrier-based fighter to replace the F3F-1 and three companies responded - Seversky with a navalized version of the P-35, the XFNF-1, Grumman with an uprated F3F-1 (another biplane) as the XF4F-1 and Brewster with its design, labled the XF2A, and based on an earlier two-seat fighter design study for the XSBA. The XF2A would be powered by either a Wright XR-1690-02 ... Continue Reading

 It is clear that the XFV-12A program will not enhance the image of naval aviation. Note that in this case the outcome was not only predictable, but was in fact predicted. As is so often the case, all of the principals in the decision have moved on in both OSD and the Navy. The task of justification will fall on others and will be difficult. It is to be hoped that the same mistakes will not be made again, although the entire V/STOL program certainly has the potential.  - George Spangenberg, 1977 memo to RADM Ekas, USN (NAVAIR)   The 1970's -- disco balls, cardigan sweaters in the White House, double digit inflation and unemployment.  The nation was in the grip of stagflation and post-Vietnam malaise; defense spending and investment was down substantially and traditional big ticket items, like nuclear aircraft carriers, were increasingly difficult to fund.  It was, in a word, an age of diminished expectations.  In the early 70's an idea surfaced of using smaller ships with an air capability to supplement the big decks, especially for things like convoy duty.  A reduced (much) size "airwing" of a dozen or so ASW helos, 2-3 AEW helos and 6-7 VSTOL fighters would be embarked on these "sea control" ships.  The ASW helos were already in the inventory - SH-2's or SH-3's, and AEW helo would be based on one of those, most likely the SH-3 - like the Royal Navy did.  The VSTOL fighter though, would be a problem.  The AV-8A Harrier did not possess an all weather ... Continue Reading

Part I Part II Here was a case where McNamara, I think, expected me to keep the admirals in line. The more I looked into it, the more I became convinced that the matter had reached such an emotional state that even if the F-111B, the Navy version, turned out to be an excellent airplane, and it wasn’t all that good, but even if it did, the Navy still wouldn’t want it. So I went to McNamara and said, "You may not like it, but it seems to me we have got to face reality here. Congress is turning against this. The Navy doesn’t want it." When I say "the Navy" I am talking about the aviators in the Navy. -- Paul Ignatius, SECNAV, 1967-69 Senator, there isn’t enough power in all of Christendom to make that airplane what we want.  -- VADM Tom Connolly testifying before the Senate Armed Services Committee (1968) So now TFX was well and truly dead - the Navy had what it wanted, sort of.  It still, however, was faced with the need for a future fighter to replace the F-4, meeting the Fleet Air Superiority needs as originally specified for the F-111B, but also a maneuverable fighter whose requirements were emerging from the lessons-learned by a variety of Navy, Marine and Air Force fighters and crews in the skies over Vietnam.  The first of these requirements was the OFR or "Other Fighter Requirements", generated when it first appeared that the F-111B would not ... Continue Reading

“Senator, there isn’t enough power in all of Christendom to make that airplane what we want” VADM Tom Connolly testifying before the Senate Armed Services Committee (1968)       In Part I we explored some of the politics (and politicking) behind the TFX – the program to provide the Air Force and Navy with a common next generation fighter. For the Air Force it was to be a long-range fighter-bomber with tree-top level supersonic dash capabilities. For Navy, it was the Fleet Air Defense mission, armed with long-range missiles. After several proposals were forwarded by Boeing and General Dynamics that fell short of Service requirements, a final selection was made in November 1962 in favor of GD despite the two Services preference for the Boeing proposal. For the next six years, the design, especially the Navy design, would be dogged by political bickering and infighting between Navy and OSD. But what was the aircraft itself like? Was it really that bad? It was.       GD and Boeing came to the table early in the process with impressive pedigrees as aircraft manufacturers on the cutting edge of technology. Boeing for having brought not one, but two all jet bombers into service for the Air Force, fielded with a new jet tanker (which formed the basis for the highly successful 707 commercial jet) and was in the process of building the next generation of ICBM, the Minuteman. GD, through its Convair division, had developed and produced the F-102 and F-106 delta-winged fighters, the latter of which was equipped to participate in the computerized Semi-Automatic Ground Environment ... Continue Reading

  1959. Changes are afoot in the tactical aircraft programs for Air Force and Navy’s specific requirements. The Air Force sought to replace the F-105 with a new fighter-bomber that would address the shortcomings of the Thunderchief – it was to land in half the distance of the F-105, be able to fly unrefueled to Europe or Southeast Asia (the latter with one refueling), have a tree-top dash capability of 900 kts for 400 nm and a high altitude dash speed of 1400+ kts. By 1960, these requirements were formalized in TAC’s Specific Operational Requirement Number 183. On the Navy’s side, the prospect of facing large raids of missile carrying aircraft in the near future led to the requirement for a missile carrying platform that would engage the raids at long-range. In combination with the new F4H-1 Phantom, in prototype stage, the Fleet Air Defense mission would be satisfied with this combination of fast-climbing/high-speed interceptor carrying short and medium range missiles to intercept any leakers that made it through the barrier established by the long-range missiles launched from their carrier.             Development contracts for the Eagle and its supporting weapons system were let to Bendix in December, 1958 and in July 1960, Douglas won the lengthy competition to design and build two prototypes, the XF6D-1, around this weapons system.  The Air Force was further away from such a stage when the new Secretary of Defense, Robert S. McNamara, decided that all the Service requirements would be rolled into a single concept.  In a memo dated 1 Sept ... Continue Reading