Implementing the Maritime Strategy: Sizing the Force

 A couple of articles in the open press that reveal portions of VADM Morgan’s “Three Futures, One Navy, A Portfolio Analysis” thought piece on three different futures of what the navy might look like have spurred some pretty decent discussions – again – in the Navy blogsphere, particularly over at the usual suspects.  Now we suppose it’s time for the brown shoes amongst us to weigh-in and you might just be surprised where we land – but more on that later…    

 

 

First, a quick summary of the three futures courtesy Defense News:

Major combat operations:  263 ships; tailored for battle against a peer competitor and composed of 12 aircraft carriers, 13 big-deck amphibious helicopter carriers, 26 amphibious ships, 81 cruisers and destroyers, 54 corvettes (nee LCS), 21 auxiliaries and 56 submarines (including SSN, SSGN and SSBN).


Shaping force: 534 ships, mostly corvettes and patrol boats – geared towards littoral, maritime security and partnership operations and composed of six aircraft carriers, 24 big-deck amphibious helicopter carriers, 48 amphibious ships, 48 cruisers and destroyers, 161 corvettes, 200 patrol craft, 30 riverine squadrons, 15 auxiliaries, and 32 submarines of all classes.


Balanced force: 474 ships to conduct ops from high-end battle to low-end counterterrorism and maritime security and composed of nine aircraft carriers, 23 big-deck amphibious helicopter carriers, 46 amphibious ships, 57 cruisers and destroyers, 132 corvettes, 160 patrol craft, 20 riverine squadrons, 15 auxiliaries and 32 submarines of all classes.

 
Most of the discussion has centered on the balanced force (like it), plus-up in amphib construction across the board (generally for though some, like galrahn have suggestions for improving the force to include nuke amphibs) to concern about not enough subs, especially of the SSN variety. To the latter point we would add our agreement.
 

The next point is one that pains us very much to make, but needs to be made nonetheless. Nine CVNs is truly the minimum that one can effectively employ, deploy, and maintain combat-credible carrier-based airpower. There have been several studies conducted that underscore this number and how dropping below starts a chain reaction of ever-expanding loss of capability and coverage. Were it up to us, we would prefer a number closer to 15 carriers, but spending priorities and budget realities being what they are, we doubt we will ever see a return to the days when defense as a portion of GDP even measured appreciably in the high single digits.

  

The combination of the new CVN design with its ability to generate a much higher sortie rate, with an airwing comprised of new capabilities like the electronic attack afforded by the EA-18G Growler and the enhanced detection, command and control of the E-2D will raise the bar, yet again, over what today’s CVN/CVW team brings to the battle. Still, there are concerns. Concerns like are we going to have enough planes to fill those nine decks? 
 
In the near future, the production lines for the F/A-18 E/F will be open for sometime to come as will that for the E-2D (the latter especially as the allowance/squadron is increased from 4 to 5 or 6). Further down the road, of course, is the F-35C. Maybe. We sufficiently believe that if push comes to shove that the F-35C would be the first tossed over the side in the search for across the board cost savings. All other aircraft programs are in such a state that there is no question of the need for a replacement or protection from cuts. We have boxed ourselves into a corner for an MPA replacement with the excessive flight hours burned on the P-3 fleet. We don’t have a fixed-wing carrier-based ASW capability anymore to pickup the slack, nor is one projected (and time will show that as capable as the SH/UH-60 is, it is not a 1:1 replacement). Hence the P-7/BAMS program is a must. The E-2D and F/A-18E/F/G programs are the same (and have the added impetus of being available for FMS). The Marines are too heavily invested in the F-35B as well as are our foreign partners. Then there is the specter of the UCAV-N. If the UCAV-N arrives and performs in such a manner that radically alters thinking about such issues as deep strike/first day strike from a carrier, perhaps one requirement for the F-35 will be eliminated?
 
Missing too in the admittedly open press discussion of a presumed longer and classified document is discussion of BMD. The further we get into the next decade the greater a role BMD will play – across a variety of scenarios and big Navy’s role will correspondingly grow as indicated in the Maritime Strategy. From the limited role it plays now, contributing surveillance and tracking in the Homeland Defense role to an active engage against SR- and MRBM threats in mid-course mode (IRBM-threats in a more limited manner), by the next decade the panoply of threats navy will have to counter will stretch from terminal to theater to intercontinental and the capabilities to engage and destroy the threat will entail all three stages of ballistic flight – launch, mid-course and terminal. Some capabilities will have to be resident on nearly all platforms too, not just destroyers and cruisers, though the more challenging portions of the engagement will call for specialized ships to carry the specialized weapons.
 
Still, ‘tis a healthy turn in the discussion and we are heartened to see it evolve. We make no secret of the fact that our desire is along the lines of more is better and a fleet larger than 313, properly balanced for a range of missions and threats is the best. 

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2 Comments

  1. I’m jealous. Over on the light blue side of the house we’re still trying to figure out how to get half of our air defense fleet ungrounded. Forget about actually figuring out the future.

  2. I’m a bit envious, as well, and not only for the reasons Mike stated… even though his reason is a danged good one. The USAF’s recapitalization dilemma/drama, coupled with shoot-yourself-in-the-foot acquisition scandals and mis-steps, and severe budget shortfalls is pretty danged discouraging. Kinda-sorta has a deja-vu flavor about it, though. Think “Carter,” compounded by the near-certainty of a coming Democrat administration and Congressional majority. Aiieee…

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