CINCLAX checks in with a strategic summary of where the players stand at this point in the Solomons Campaign. As we will see here and in detail later ths week with the Battles of Santa Cruz and Guadalcanal I & II, this is still a very close run deal with either the Japanese or Allied forces in a position to come out on top. How close is it? See below… – SJS
In his State of the Union message in January 1943, FDR would note:
â€œThe Axis powers knew that they must win the war in 1942–or eventually lose everything. I do not need to tell you that our enemies did not win the war in 1942.â€
He was correct. All IJN commanders, especially Yamamoto, knew that Japan’s only chance in the Pacific War against the United States was to win a â€œdecisive battleâ€ and hopefully bring the United States to a negotiated peace. Assuming this strategy would have succeeded, which is, of course, a huge assumption in view of American bitterness over Pearl Harbor, it meant Japan had to win it early-on before the vastly greater American war production capacity could be brought to bear, presumably by mid/late-1943. Japan had simply not prepared for a protracted naval war.
Inescapably this meant the IJN had to take chances, just as they had with the Pearl Harbor attack in the first place. Would they?
Six months into the war, Yamamoto’s first decisive battle attempt failed completely at Midway, largely because he underestimated his opponent and needlessly divided his forces with an almost impossibly complex plan. As a result, some nine battleships, one fleet carrier, three light carriers, nine heavy cruisers and 30 destroyers actually put to sea but took no part in the main Midway action. Here was a force capable of pulverizing Midway all on its own, leaving Kido Butai to deal directly with TF-16 and TF-17 without worrying about having to bomb the atoll.
Now, several months later in the Solomons, Yamamoto would get his second-and perhaps final-opportunity for that decisive battle. If the Japanese could hand the U.S. Navy a crushing defeat and force the American troops to surrender or withdraw from Guadalcanal, they would stand their best chance of achieving that negotiated peace. So far the IJN had not sought that battle. They had committed their surface forces piecemeal at a critical time when the Americans were relatively weak and the â€œCactusâ€ air force still small.
Still, by mid-October 1942, most of the signs were still favorable for a potential Japanese victory:
- American senior naval leadership to-date was irresolute, notably Ghormley and Fletcher.
- The American Joint Chiefs had already diverted large amounts of Army and Navy assets to the upcoming Torch landings in North Africa. The British continually pressured their ally for increased operations in the Mediterranean Theatre and would continue to do so throughout 1943.
- The IJN had proved its superior skills and weaponry in surface night actions.
- The Cactus Air Force was largely unable to stop the â€œTokyo Expressâ€ fast re-supply and troop transport convoys. The new TBFs with their old MK-13 torpedoes hardly ever made hits, the SBDs had great difficulty scoring on anything but slow transports, and the B-17s were useful only for reconnaissance. Thus Japanese surface warships underway were largely immune from American attack planes. (Note: We’ll be seeing more about this in the near future – SJS)
- American submarines-and torpedoes-had been singularly ineffective, and to-date there had been no disruption of the delivery of oil and raw materials from the Southern Resources Area. In contrast, Japanese I-Boats had been doing solid work against American warships.
- The opening of the new airbase at Buin (Bougainville) cut the flight time to Henderson Field almost in half (compared to Rabaul) and allowed the Japanese to come closer to maintaining air superiority over Guadalcanal because they could now employ their shorter range Zeros (model 21s).
- The floatplane base at Rekata Bay (on Santa Isabel and only 130 miles from Henderson Field) continued to provide a modicum of air reconnaissance in the waters around Guadalcanal.
- The IJN had substantial heavy surface units at anchor in the Home Islands and Truk, including superbattleship Yamato. If ever they were going to play a truly key role and not simply collect barnacles, this was their time to get into the fight.
- After the Battle of Santa Cruz (October 26-27), for nearly a month the Americans would have no operable carriers in the Pacific.
But time was limited, and Yamamoto’s window of opportunity was closing fast. The handwriting was on the wall for all Japanese to see.
- On Guadalcanal, the 17th Army was in dire straits. While the fast destroyer transports of the Tokyo Express were having some success in landing new troops, they could not carry much in the way of heavy equipment, ammunition, food or medicine. Within a month, over 100 soldiers a day would be dying of starvation and/or disease, and combat effectiveness would be down to 20-30%.
- The costly failure of Gen. Hyakutake’s October offensive had exhausted the army to the point where it could no longer strongly defend the west bank of the Matanikau River. Soon, land-based shelling of Henderson Field would no longer be possible because the Japanese guns would be out of range.
- Since Midway, the carrier air groups and the IJN air fleets were already under strength and steadily running out of their most experienced air crews due to combat and operational losses. The replacement pipeline wasn’t doing the job; people were available, but the training hours weren’t.
- In New Guinea, the Japanese attack down the Kokoda Trail had been stopped by the Australians, and Port Moresby remained in Allied hands as an important air base from where constant attacks could be launched eastward against Rabaul as well as northward towards the Bismarck Sea.
- New American warships (or repaired vessels, notably carriers) and additional transports could be expected in-theatre within 4-8 weeks.
- New model American fighter aircraft could be expected to replace the tired and outclassed F4Fs-and in greater numbers. Soon an air raid on Henderson Field would be an impossibly costly venture.
So what did Yamamoto eventually do? We’ll see in the coming week’s posts…
(Crossposted at USNI blog)
Article Series - Solomon Islands Campaign Blog Project
- The Solomons Campaign: Geographical and Political Background
- The Solomons Campaign: Status of the United States Fleet and Plans After Midway
- The Imperial Japanese Navy after Midway
- The Solomon Islands Campaign: Prelude to the Series
- The Solomons Campaign: WATCHTOWER — Why Guadalcanal?
- The Solomons Campaign: Guadalcanal 7-9 August, 1942 — Assault and Lodgment
- The Solomons Campaign: Unleashing the Assassin’s Mace
- The Solomons Campaign: Execution at Savo Island
- The Solomons Campaign: The Battle of the Eastern Solomons, 24-25 August 1942
- The Solomons Campaign: Strategic Pause and Review – Japan’s Last Chance for Victory?
- The Solomons Campaign: THE BATTLE OF GUADALCANAL, Part I
- The Solomons Campaign: THE BATTLE OF GUADALCANAL, Part II
- The Solomons Campaign: Cactus Air Force and the Bismarck Sea
- The Solomons Campaign: Operation Vengeance – The Shootdown Of Yamamoto
- The Solomons Campaign: Ground Action – The New Georgia Campaign, June 20-November 3, 1943
- The Solomons Campaign: The Bougainville Invasion, November – December 1943(Part I)
- The Bougainville Invasion: November – December 1943 (Part 2)
- The Bougainville Invasion (Part 3): December 1943 â€“ March 1944
- The Bougainville Invasion (Part 4): March 1944 â€“ May 1944
- The Solomons Campaign: Battle of Santa Cruz (Part I)
- The Solomons Campaign: Battle of Santa Cruz (II)
- The Solomons Campaign: The Battle of Santa Cruz (III)
- Flightdeck Friday – MIA Edition: WWII Navy Aircrew Returns Home