Steeljaw Scribe

Bryan McGrath, lead author of CS21 (as it is coming to be called in shorthand) stopped by in the comments section in the previous post to leave the commentary now shown below.  I opted (head nod to Peter S. per our earlier discussion) to elevate it to a post of its own for wider dissemination and comment.  Bryan makes some good points, especially where the two other missing pieces are concerned and some interesting revelations as to what he expected to follow from the influence of CS21 in the form of actual metal.  On the whole, I think we're in pretty violent agreement about many items.  One in particular is where we go from here.  The next couple of years are going to be crucial ones for Navy.  If one of the unwritten intents of  CS21 was to build an advocacy for the Navy and naval forces for the long view, mindful of the prolonged land engagement(s) we have been and look to continue conducting, and that constituency is primarily outside Navy (e.g., the public and Congress), then there needs to be some serious effort applied by senior leadership to revitalizing that advocacy, especially on the Hill where the initial offering two years ago was received with, well, lukewarm (to put it charitably) enthusiasm.  In light of an ongoing failure to produce the other legs of the stool, as Bryan points out, and with diminished expectations for budgetary relief, Navy needs to revitalize the advocacy, fleshing it out with supporting ... Continue Reading

Two years ago this week, the CNO, CMC and USCG Commandant released the naval services’ new maritime strategy – A Cooperative Strategy for 21st Century Seapower, at the International Seapower Symposium being hosted by the Naval War College in Newport, RI. The release of a new maritime strategy was significant given the length of time, post-Cold War, the naval services in general – and the Navy in particular, had planned, budgeted and operated without one.  To be sure, there were iterations and evolutionary versions that followed the seminal 1980’s strategy that called for a 500 (later 600) ship navy to take the fight to the Soviet Union, but for the most part they were a ‘check-in-the-box’ and left on the shelf to collect dust.  In fact, during the earlier part of this decade, we were personally told on more than one occasion (forcefully and with exasperation at times) by senior Navy leadership that a new strategy was no longer required as we had moved beyond that and had Seapower 21 to guide our way.  Selah. Mid-decade though, that began to change with new leadership and a growing realization that new constructs and approaches would be required in the post-Cold War, post-9/11 world.  Beginning with open and closed sessions with strategists, planners and “thinkers” drawn from across public and private enterprise, in venues reaching from local to national and international, a small team of planners, thinkers and writers – operators all, began to build the new strategy. The new strategy was released with ... Continue Reading

*But were afraid to ask Available now via the Newport Papers online - print version still TBD. Be forewarned, this is a huge document (34M worth) and will take a while to download.  This is an outstanding work by Dr. Hattendorf and Peter Swartz and has been long in the birthing process.  It is the benchmark for the development of what many consider to be one of the most important documents in the modern US Navy's history and, for better or worse, the benchmark strategy against which future strategies, including the current strategy, "A Cooperative Strategy for 21st Century Seapower" is compared and judged.  Expanding one's view, it also  should be of interest to students of modern history, especially the latter days of the Cold War and its immediate aftermath.  To quote the opening paragraph: The decade of the 1980s was the decade of "the Maritime Strategy," the U.S. Navy's widely known and publicly debated statement that was associated with President Ronald Reagan's buildup of American defense forces and Secretary of the Navy John Lehman's efforts to create "the six-hundred-ship navy." The strategy is most widely understood only in terms of the Navy's January 1986 public statements published in the U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings and summarized in testimony that the Navy's leaders had given to Congress. This volume is designed to complement and extend the previously published history of The Evolution of the U.S.Navy's Maritime Strategy, 1977-1986, and to present publicly for the first time the detailed changes and developments that occurred during the ... Continue Reading

This little notice arrived in the mail yesterday: New Navy Operations Concept Will Include Force Structure Details NOC Due By October (INSIDE THE NAVY 22 SEP 08) ... Zachary M. Peterson The 2008 Navy Operations Concept, known as the NOC, will include force structure details not included in the tri-service maritime strategy released last year and in the 2006 version of the document, a high-ranking Navy admiral said last week.  more details: "We are working hard to incorporate force-structure analysis that we've been working on, so when we go to our partners in Congress, in . . . it tells you I need 'X' number of ships, 'X' number of airplanes to operate the Navy, Marine Corps and Coast Guard in a manner required in the Naval Operations Concept to support the maritime strategy," Vice Adm. Barry McCullough, deputy chief of naval operations for integration of resources and capabilities, said Sept. 16 at a luncheon sponsored by the Surface Navy Association. Interesting etymology note -- First citation above speaks of the Navy Operations Concept and VADM McCullough's quote talks about the Naval Operations Concept - an important distinction in that the former concentrates only on Navy while the latter, like the Maritime Strategy, incorporates the Marines and Coast Guard, an important distinction especially where force structure discussion is concerned.  Of course it could also just be lax journalism or casual useage of seemingly indistinguishable terms (highly doubtful if that is the case where VADM McCullough is concerned however...).  We're calling it the Naval Operations Concept ... Continue Reading

Deterrence. Preventing war is preferable to fighting wars. Deterring aggression must be viewed in global, regional, and transnational terms via conventional, unconventional, and nuclear means. Effective Theater Security Cooperation activities are a form of extended deterrence, creating security and removing conditions for conflict. Maritime ballistic missile defense will enhance deterrence by providing an umbrella of protection to forward-deployed forces and friends and allies, while contributing to the larger architecture planned for defense of the United States . . . We will use forward based and forward deployed forces, space-based assets, sea-based strategic deterrence and other initiatives to deter those who wish us harm.  - A Cooperative Strategy for 21st Century Seapower (Oct 2007) Longtime readers (all 2 of you) will remember when we wrote some two years ago about the first of the Aegis-CG's being dispatched in a SINKEX at the ripe old age of 18 years.  Following the wholesale decommissioning of the Spruances and their dispatch in other SINKEX's, some wondered aloud about the future of the remaining CG-47s and even the newer Burke-class DDGs. Well, we have an answer - sort of. There is an extensive plan being put into action to ensure a full 35 years of relevant operational service will be gained from the Burkes (assuming, of course, proper corrosion prevention and other PMS - comments Byron?) and the remaining Ticonderoga CG's.  The program for the Burkes will begin in 2012 and will concentrate on Hull, Mechanical and Electrical repairs, to be followed by combat systems improvements.  First out ... Continue Reading

Ballistic missile defense from the sea - over the last six months the concept has moved further from test and development to operational reality.  Demonstrated capabilities are expanding the envelope and being delivered to certain designated ships within the fleet.  The question is - in describing these recent advances in ballistic missile defense, including the nation's strong commitment and cooperation with international partners, what does that portend for the Navy and the Maritime Strategy? In case you missed it, 2007 was a growth year for ballistic missile defense.  The US,  through efforts by the Missile Defense Agency and the Navy among others, demonstrated live kill capabilities across a range of threats from a simulated IR/ICBM brought down in mid-course by a California-based ground-launched interceptor, to a scenario where an Aegis BMD cruiser engaged and destroyed two near-simultaneous launched Scud-like ballistic missile targets in the mid-course flight phase.  The year was capped when the Japanese destroyer Kongo completed the first maritime ballistic missile intercept by a country other than the U.S. when it destroyed a short-range ballistic missile target.  It was followed in the new year with the intercept of the failing satellite and most recently, with a successful test of the sea-based terminal capability. 2007 represented a banner year of another sorts for ballistic missiles.  The rate of launches this past year was greater than in 2006 - a year marked by such signatory events as the July 4/5 North Korean missile crisis and Iran's "Noble Prophet" exercises in the spring that ... Continue Reading

Well, you know what the poet said about the best plans of mice and men. We had been scheduled to participate in the blogger's roundtable today with RADM Stevensen regarding the standup of 4th Fleet. Alas, our day job intruded with unplanned, last minute tasking but the host, Jack Holt graciously submitted our questions during the roundtable. Full transcript may be found here and the audio file here. The question we were particularly interested in had to do with support. Having spent a good portion of our years batting (some will get the pun) about the AOR, we note that a good portion of the infrastructure, such as it was even then, has subsequenly been closed down and, well, let's go to the tape: And we would hope, as the Joint High Speed Vessel program gets going, that we could do that, or that the Navy decides to renegotiate some contracts,and that we can get those types of vessels, because it's not only just what we do. It's the capabilities that they can bring to any service down here, kind of like an afloat staging base, if you will, with a number of endless possibilities that you could embark up on it. MR. HOLT: That kind of brings up the question that Steeljaw Scribe sent in to me. And it is, his question is, quote, "With the decline of the supporting infrastructure in the region and the closure of naval stations Roosevelt Roads and Rodman, et cetera, how ... Continue Reading

  JDS Kongo arrives in Pearl Harbor for JFTM-01       Deterrence. Deterring aggression must be viewed in global, regional, and transnational terms via conventional, unconventional, and nuclear means. Effective Theater Security Cooperation activities are a form of extended deterrence, creating security and removing conditions for conflict. Maritime ballistic missile defense will enhance deterrence by providing an umbrella of  protection to forward-deployed forces and friends and allies, while contributing to the larger architecture planned for defense of the United States. ("A Cooperative Strategy for 21st Century Seapower") (17 Dec 07) Rear Admiral Katsutoshi Kawano, of the Japan Maritime Self-Defense Force (JMSDF) and Lt. General Henry “Trey” Obering III, Director of the United Stated Missile Defense Agency, announced today the successful completion of the cooperative Aegis Ballistic Missile Defense (BMD) intercept flight test, off the coast of Kauai in Hawaii. The event, designated Japan Flight Test Mission 1 (JFTM-1), marked the first time that an Allied Navy ship has successfully intercepted a ballistic missile target with the sea-based midcourse engagement capability provided by Aegis BMD. The JFTM-1 test event verified the new engagement capability of the Aegis BMD configuration of the recently upgraded Japanese destroyer, JS KONGO (DDG-173). At approximately 12:05 pm (HST), 7:05 am Tokyo time on Dec. 18, 2007, a ballistic missile target was launched from the Pacific Missile Range Facility, Barking Sands, Kauai, Hawaii. JS KONGO crew members detected and tracked the target. The Aegis Weapon System then developed a fire control solution and at approximately 12:08 pm (HST), 7:08 am Tokyo time, a ... Continue Reading

Found this gem whilst out doing some scouting: The French Aéronavale will embark for the first time on an American aircraft carrier. Without a second aircraft carrier, while Charles stopped for maintenance for eighteen months, pilots of Rafale and Hawkeye are going to train in July 2008 aboard the USS Roosevelt off Norfolk, in the Atlantic. "We are setting up this operation with the American Navy" said the French Navy Office. A dozen airplanes are to be deployed on Roosevelt: six to eight Rafales of the flotilla 12 F and two Hawkeyes of the flotilla 4F. http://forum.keypublishing.co.uk/showthread.php?t=76591 One sees all sorts of interesting culture clashes - not the least of which when our guests come to realize there are but a few very limited areas they can partake of their Gauloises and none for an apertif prior to sampling the messdeck's best.  Still, considering where we were (loggerheads) a few short years ago, there must be more than a few head ready to explode overseas at the prospect of a squadron of Rafales and Hawkeyes of Fench extract operating off TR for a pro-longed period of time, even if it is a glorified CQ evolution, vice the usual one-day exchange.  Foster and sustain cooperative relationships with more international partners?  Check. Expanded cooperation with the maritime forces of other nations through more interoperability via the Global Maritime Partnership initiative?  Definitely check.  So, Lex -- realize it's the wrong coast and all, but thinking about brushing up your francois and making a run as an LNO ... Continue Reading