Nuclear Decisions (Part I)

 …if you are India. 

Nuclear Deterrence

 

The United States:

• The Nuclear Posture Review [NPR] of 2001 set the tone for nuclear strategy for US premised on three major recommendations:

1. The US must retain a robust nuclear arsenal to provide deterrence against nuclear, chemical and biological weapons. It would also guard against conventional wars, as also hard deep buried targets.
2. Significant reduction in nuclear weapons is possible since Russia is no longer a major threat to the US. The NPR suggests a scaling down of operationally deployed warheads to 3,800 by 2007 and to 1,700-2,200 by 2012. 
3. It called for strategic adaptability to meet the threats from potential enemies. It recommended that the existing downgraded weapons (termed Responsive Forces) be kept as reserves to be recalled if necessary.

• As a further step, the Quadrennial Defense Review of 2006 recommended a "tailored deterrence" instead of a one-size-fits-all approach that would deter near peer states like Russia and China or non-state actors or countries with small WMD arsenals.(emphasis added) This becomes clear from the concept of the triad. The new concept includes three different legs — Non-nuclear and nuclear strike capabilities; Active and Passive Defenses; Responsive Infrastructure. The earlier triad consisting of three delivery vehicles — ICBMs, bombers and SLBMs — is now a subset within this new concept. Flexibility would be attained not through an earlier Single Integrated Operational Plan (SIOP), but in smaller nuclear force and a more flexible nuclear strike plan like the CONPLAN 8022. It would provide the US with RMA [Revolution in Military Affairs]-based capabilities and other information networks to attack with nuclear weapons and non-nuclear weapons mounted on strategic delivery vehicles.

Russia

• Nuclear muscle flexing in Russia coincided with a deterioration of its relationship with the West. The Russian nuclear arsenal provides it with the strength: 
  • to pursue domestic policies to counter any external interference on issues like Chechnya
  • to resist external threats from the NATO and US unilateralist tendencies
• Russia places emphasis on retention and upgradation of its nuclear arsenal which is considered central to their security strategy. In 1992, Russia renounced its ‘no first use’ policy and placed reliance on its nuclear option even against an attack by conventional, biological or chemical weapons. However, Russia perceives the use of nuclear weapons in a bipolar context — against US unilateralism and NATO expansionism — but not against non-state actors.

The UK

• The UK pursues an independent nuclear deterrence strategy as is evident from its decision to replace its SSBNs in early 2007. There has been an intense debate in the UK on the role and need for nuclear weapons. The existing nuclear submarines will become obsolete by 2020. Hence, Tony Blair and his successor Gordon Brown took the decision to upgrade their nuclear deterrent. UK has pledged to effect a reduction in the number of nuclear weapons, but nuclear deterrence continues to remain its "insurance policy in an uncertain world".

France

• The concept of Force de Frappe has been central to French security forces since 1960. Not only do nuclear weapons guarantee security to France, but it is considered vital for enhancing its international status. The French concept of nuclear deterrence in 2006 while reiterating the same concepts of security and status has expanded the new missions for deterrence from nuclear to chemical and biological weapons. France hopes to deploy flexible nuclear forces with flexible yields and warheads to cater for a range of threats.

Ballistic Missile Defense

• The Rumsfeld Commission Report in 1999 laid down the rationale for BMD, which has since developed into a multi-layered interception program. It is supposed to provide the US with the capability to intercept missiles at every stage of their deployment. With the high rate of success in the BMD test programmes — out of 16 tests, fifteen proved to be successful — the US and its allies were upbeat in 2006. More nations are ready to join because of the success rate and their threat perceptions of North Korea and Iran. As a result, there is a greater discomfort in Russia.

• The Russian perception of missile defence in 2001 was very different from what it is today. In 2001, Russia reconciled itself to a limited BMD, and was skeptical regarding the technology involved. Russia believed that though US would have BMD it would also be limited, and hence not impinge on Russian security in any major way. In 2007, Russia’s perception of the BMD indicates that it has taken note of the fact that BMD is expanding on its borders. Russia thus views the BMD as destabilizing and threatening to its strategic stability.

• Both UK and France were skeptical of the BMD in the initial years. However, the UK now has a radar that is functional and feeds into the US BMD and is also willing to have interceptors on its soil. France is more neutral towards NATO deployment of BMD as of now and is more interested in an EU-centered TMD [theater missile defense]. Meanwhile, the US considers its BMD deployment in Poland and the Czech Republic to be part of bilateral agreements and believes that NATO can be included in these at some later point in time. Hence, there is no unity of approach in the US, NATO or EU on the issue of BMD.

 

Nuclear Arsenal and Weapons Infrastructure

 

• Although the NPR has technically not favoured any new types of weapons, it has sought modifications in the existing weapons to meet current threats emanating from non-state actors and the small WMD arsenals of rogue states. The US requires smart conventional weapons and smaller nuclear munitions. Accordingly, the US has initiated its Reliable Replacement Warhead programme (RRW) that will replace the aging stockpile to improve the reliability, longevity and certifiability of the existing weapons. The RRWs are not new nuclear weapons but would refurbish the existing nuclear weapons infrastructure known as the Complex 2030. The RRW will also help to develop new and safer warhead designs that will lead to a reduction in stockpiles. Development of Robust Nuclear Earth Penetrators (RNEP or bunker busters) is also on the cards.

• Russia is also thinking of developing cutting edge strategic weapons emphasizing quality over quantity. It is likely to deploy the mobile Topol land-based missiles and sea-based Bulava missiles, MIRV [multiple independently targetable reentry vehicle] its missiles, and develop a new generation of nuclear submarines.

• In the UK and France, the design and development of new SSBNs has been sanctioned and is supplemented by the modernization of missiles. France tested an 8000-km range missile in 2006 and is also developing warheads of varied yield, since it wants a range of options for nuclear deterrence.

 Arms Control

• In the current state of affairs, the prospects for arms control appear dim. The Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) has been comatose since 1999. The Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty also fell apart after 2002, when the US walked out of it. In response, Russia abandoned the Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START) II, leaving it in a state of limbo. The Fissile Material Cut-off Treaty (FMCT) is floundering in the CD [Conference on Disarmament] and has a long way to go. The Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty has been threatened by Russia and the Treaty on Strategic Offensive Reductions (SORT) — the only existing treaty between the US and Russia — is flexible, reversible and non-verifiable.