National Intelligence Estimate: Iran Stopped Bomb Effort In 2003…

"We cannot rule out that Iran has acquired from abroad—or will acquire in the future—a nuclear weapon or enough fissile material for a weapon."

"We assess centrifuge enrichment is how Iran probably could first produce enough fissile material for a weapon, if it decides to do so. Iran resumed its declared centrifuge enrichment activities in January 2006, despite the continued halt in the nuclear weapons program. Iran made significant progress in 2007 installing centrifuges at Natanz, but we judge with moderate confidence it still faces significant technical problems operating them."

"We judge with moderate confidence Iran probably would be technically capable of producing enough HEU for a weapon sometime during the 2010-2015 time frame.  (INR judges Iran is unlikely to achieve this capability before 2013 because of foreseeable technical and programmatic problems.) All agencies recognize the possibility that this capability may not be attained until after 2015."

"We assess with moderate confidence that convincing the Iranian leadership to forgo the eventual development of nuclear weapons will be difficult given the linkage many within the leadership probably see between nuclear weapons development and Iran’s key national security and foreign policy objectives, and given Iran’s considerable effort from at least the late 1980s to 2003 to develop such weapons. In our judgment, only an Iranian political decision to abandon a nuclear weapons objective would plausibly keep Iran from eventually producing nuclear weapons—and such a decision is inherently reversible."

 Ergo the emphasis must continue to be diplomatic in thrust, including sanctions, tough sanctions with teeth to be sure, but still a diplomatic approach vice military strike(s).  The reasons remain twofold: (1) there is enough uncertainty surrounding the Iranian nuclear infrastructure to mitigate against the surety of eliminating their means of production in a single strike, but more importantly is the second point.  There appears in the text of the NIE a strong suggestion of political possibility, maybe bypassing Ahmadinejad and the IRG, to bring this to a diplomatic solution.  For comparative purposes, there  is, afterall, what appears to be a nascent successful model in North Korea. 

Still, as the extracted quotes imply, caution is dictated.  If Iran’s intent is to slow roll the West while producing enough HEU to construct weapons (and note, mere possession of x-amount of HEU does not mean voila,  a weapon, or weapons now exist), then the West needs to implement sufficiently strong and painful sanctions as to dissuade Iran from this path, else face the prospect of dealing with a nuclear armed Iran sometime in the next decade.  And, by the way, an Iran that will have moved sufficiently far along the indigenous development path in its IRBM program to cause major concern for the Mideast, Europe and, oh yes, Russia…