Steeljaw Scribe

Tomorrow we will have our Independence Day post up and in the busy comings goings of a three-day weekend, we encourage one and all to pause and ponder those words — mere words in some folks’ opinion; that our forefathers penned in Philadelphia that hot summer of 1776.  Men had already died in the cause of Liberty – many more were to come.  In the decades and centuries hence, more still in the cause of preserving that radical ( for its time) belief that a government exists for the benefit of man, not vice versa, and its sole province lay in the securing of one’s birthright to life, liberty and the pursuit of happiness.

In the skies over Occupied Europe in 1943, life for the bomber crews of the 8th Air Force was always teetering on the edge – if the sub-zero temperatures and lack of oxygen at flight altitude didn’t numb and then silently kill you, then the murderous flak or ever present fighters with their 20mm cannon would  rip flesh and aluminum to shreds, blotting life out in a burst of obscene red, yellow and black.  Happiness was surviving 25 missions and being rotated out of theater, like the crew of the Memphis Bell.  Many were not so fortunate.  The slaughter, for what else could it be called when 30, 40, 60-plus aircraft and crew per mission were being lost, almost brought the daytime campaign to a stop .  Similar loss rates had plagued the British effort earlier and was the chief reason they had switched to a nght/area bombing campaign.  Nevertheless, the crews pressed on and the following year the appearance of a new long-range escort fighter, the P-51, enabled deeper penetration of the German fortress – all the way to the factories and cities in the heart of the Nazi territory, contributing in no small measure to the  eventual liberty of the occupied territories and even the Germans themselves, from the very kind of state-centered machine our forefathers had in mind as they penned those immortal words.

Presented here today then, is a glimpse into the life of one crew engaged in that fight.  Ut lego est scio quod agnosco…

– SJS

In 1943 the US found itself in that turbulent stage of transition where the war was no longer a matter of fighting defensive battles, but neither was offense reigning supreme.  On several fronts, despite some success, progress was haltingly tentative and the prospects of a reversal of fortune seemed to be permanent presence at the portal.  In the Pacific, following the decisive win at Midway the previous year, the Combined Fleet of the Japanese was still capable of landing seriously mortal blows as US forces discovered at Savo Island  and Santa Cruz.   In Africa, there was the debacle at Kasserine were poorly-led and ill-prepared US forces were ruthlessly routed and destroyed in the first major battle between US and German forces.  Meanwhile, in England, the first of the daylight raids supporting the American advocated doctrine of daylight precision bombing were taking flight over occupied territory in Europe, but it was still the RAF’s bomber command that was mustering the very large formations for nighttime strikes on the Nazi homeland using area bombing.

Back in the US, production lines had already shifted to an around-the-clock, 7-days a week cycle. Primary producers of high-demand items, like Boeing’s B-17, were starting to establish auxiliary production lines with former competitors and across boundaries with similar industries.  Thus Douglas, a fierce rival of Boeing’s in the transportation industry, was producing B-17’s and Ford automobile plants were being converted to produce Consolidated’s B-24 Liberator.   Meanwhile – pilots and crews were needed in volume to fly the planes and across the heartland of the US, reported in growing numbers to hastily built airfields in the (very) rural parts of the Midwest.  There, the signature three-runway airfields hosted primary training for new B-17 and B-24 crews.  Places like McCook Army Airfield, Scribner Army Airfield and Grand Island, all in Nebraska.  The drone of Wright 1820’s reverberated across the flat plains, day and night, through the spring with its sudden thunderstorms and the long, hazy days of summer.  And across the Atlantic, the numbers continued to build.

On an early September day in 1943, one B-17 lifted from the field at Grand Island, bound for stopping points in Maine, Goose Bay, Labrador;  Sonderstrom, Greenland;  and Keflavik, Iceland.  Waypoints enroute to its ultimate destination in the British Isles – RAF Great Ashfield, one of many places in the southeast corner of England that was seeing the descendants of the Mayflower return, en masse, for the coming aerial onslaught of Festung Europa.  Crewing the Fortress was the pilot, Robert “Tex” Taylor with Joel Punches as the plane’s navigator and chronicler.

The log that Lt Punches generated provides insight into the lives of the (very) young men that began to take the fight back to the Germans.  Its terse prose reflects the early sense of adventure and wonderment at things new:

“9-4-43: Took off from Grand Island, Nebraska for Maine.  Buzzed Soucek’s (ed: bombardier) house in Chicago.  Flew over Toronto, Canada, Lake Superior, Lake Michigan.  Landed at 1745.  Really cold.  Sure pretty country.  Lots of lakes, pine trees, etc.  Bangor, Maine.
“9-7-43: Took off downhill and with the wind for Iceland (ed: that’s the way it is at Sonderstrom   – you approach up the fjord, land upslope  and takeoff downslope.  – SJS).  Climbed over ice caps at 16,000 ft.  Bad Weather.  Snow, Rain, Hail.  Good sun shots and ETA okay. 5 miles left of course.  Northern lights really bright.  Polaris overhead.”
“ 9-8-43: Weathered in.  Raining.  Went to Reykjavik (40,000 pop)   People all pro-Nazi, unfriendly, backward.  Seems 30 years behind US in civilization.  Got 13 hours sleep, beard beginning to grow.”
“9-11-43: Stayed last night in old Scottish mansion, converted to officer’s quarters.  People friendly.  Their bitter beer tastes lousy.  Their ale is good.  Left on train for London – 400 miles.”

Of course there was more training to accomplish:

“9-16-43: Had 8 hrs. of lecture today.  How to escape from Germany & France, ditching procedures, etc. “
“9-17-43: 8 hrs. of class again.”
“9-19-43: Got to 385th OK and were assigned to 550th  squadron.  “The Red Squadron” Today a B-17 caught fire on the line & blew up with 600 lb. of bombs on and 23,000 gals of gas.  Blew the engines two blocks away.  Killed one fireman.  Went to 8 hrs. of class today.”

And the stark reality of war made plainly evident on a training mission:

“9-26-43: Today 3 squadrons went on a practice mission out over the North Sea.  We were in the 2nd squadron.  The lead navigator took us too far.  We ended up 20 miles from the Dutch coast – a practice mission nobody had any machine guns aboard.  Three M.E. 109’s attacked the rear squadron & shot down two of our B-17’s before anyone knew they were there.  The 17’s didn’t even have any guns.  One blew up in the air & we saw the other one ditch.  Someone ought to be court-martialed for not putting guns in the ship or taking us out there.  Two 17’s gone and not one bomb dropped.  Really a mess.  Had P-47 escorts too.  The Germans could have got all 50 17’s if they had known.”

Then the missions began:

“9-28-43: Mission #1.  Went to Rheims, France, 130 miles into France – an airfield.  P-47 protection all the way.  Complete undercast.  Couldn’t see the air field so didn’t drop bombs.  Flak on the way and 10 M.E. 110 who did not attack us on the way back.  Coming back over England a B-17 on our left got out of control and came up under another and its props cut its tail off completely – clean as a knife.  Tail went up and the rest of the plane went up, over, and down.  I watched it out our left window – 7000 ft and they didn’t have a chance.  The other plane’s wing came off and it spun down also.  Just like a moving picture!  10 mi east of London.  Just then our #2 engine caught fire & we came in on 3 engines.  Good landing, however.  24 to go!

“10-14-43: Mission #5.  Schweinfurt, Germany.  Ball bearing works.  How we ever got back from this one I still don’t understand!  Four hours over Germany and three hrs. under fighter attack.  Flak over target was like a cloud and very accurate. Exactly at our altitude.  We were hit three times.  Tail, wing, and glass nose broken.  Kick off was at 1030.  Left England at 1330.  P-47 escort 20 mi. inside Germany.  When they left, the 109’s started attacking and continued for four hrs.  We were “Tail End Charlie” today, in Purple Heart corner.  Carried incendiaries.  Clear over target and when we left it was a huge mass of flames.  The whole town was burning, flames 500 ft. high.  Two ‘17’s burst into flame in the group ahead of us on the bomb run.  5 min. after the target 3 bunches of parachutes opened.  About 7-8 in each bunch.  10 min. later a ’17 crashed and burned in a forest.  JU 88’s were sitting out and firing rockets at us.  They had everything up today, JU88’s, M.E. 109’s, 210’s 30 min. later a ’17 dropped down and two fighters went down after him.  20 min. later he came out of a cloud with his engines smoking.  They all bailed out.  Our No. 1 engine ignition system was shot out & it sounded like a washing machine.  I’m afraid things are going to be tough from now on, no more “milk” runs.

“10-20-43: Mission #7.  Duren Germany.  Someone was praying hard for us today.  Left England at 1230 – 28,000 feet – 44 degrees below zero.  Spit escort.  20 min. before the target our #4 engine ran away and we couldn’t feather it.  Couldn’t hold our altitude or stay in formation.  We dropped down and turned back.  3 min. later four M.E. 109’s picked us up.  We dove down to 12,000 feet trying to get away. The fighters came in at 5, 6, & 7 o’clock on our tail making several passes. Got in to all the clouds we could…couldn’t get much speed having only three engines & a head wind.  We finally hit the coast and 20 min. later hit the English coast.  Our tail gunner was wounded.  A 20mm hit the tail.  Bullets in his leg, buttocks, and side.  Not much bleeding so no First Aid necessary.  Turned North up the coast for home but our #4 engine was burning so we landed at the nearest field, settling, an RAF Spitfire field, 5 miles south of the Thames river near London. . . Plane was riddled with holes.  Must have been 200-300 holes in it, 20 mm cannon holes (maybe 7 or in it.  Can’t see how the tail and waist gunners got back alive.  Holes within inches of them – dozens of them.  One 20mm went through our bombay with our 12 incendiary bombs still there.  Nose was not shot up as much as they all attacked from the tail.  Skinny Frier turned back 10 min.  after we did and evidently went down as they haven’t heard from him. . .Three gunners in our Group died on the raid from anoxia.  Their oxygen tubes came loose and they didn’t know it.  Moral: Stay in formation, even if you have to get out and push.”

There’s more, much more..:

WWII B-17 Log  

Postscript: On April 7, 1945 the Eighth Air Force dispatched thirty-two B-17 and B-24 groups and fourteen Mustang groups  to targets in the small area of Germany still controlled by the Nazis, hitting the remaining airfields where Luftwaffe jets were stationed. In addition, almost 300 German aircraft of all types were destroyed in strafing attacks. On April 16, this record was broken when over 700 German aircraft were destroyed on the ground.  The end came on April 25, 1945 when Eighth Air Force flew its last full-scale mission of the European War. B-17s hit the Skoda armaments factory at Pilsen in Czechoslovakia, while B-24s bombed rail complexes surrounding Hitler’s mountain retreat at Berchtesgarden.  In all, 10, 361 missions were flown by the Eight Air Force B-17 and B-24 crews with 4,145 aircraft lost in combat (6, 866 total counting all reasons for losses).

June 5th  :

” In every battle there is a moment when the combatants, and the world, seem to catch their breath. It is a fleeting moment, lost in the blink of an eye. But in that same blink, everything changes. Such moments are borne of desperation, of courage, of plain dumb luck. But they are pivotal – for what was before is forever changed afterwards. Until 1019 on the morning of 4/5 June 1942, things had gone badly for the US and its allies. With few exceptions, the Allies were fighting a losing battle in the Pacific. Indeed, as events unfolded that morning, it appeared as of the rout was on. The attacks by land-based air forces from Midway had utterly failed culminating in the loss of many aircraft. The strikes by the torpedo aircraft were decimated – an entire squadron of TBDs shot down with only a sole survivor to claim witness. An entire airgroup missed the Japanese carriers and the battle altogether and of the remaining forces, they were scattered and disorganized. The future was looking grim. At 1019, Hiryu’s senior lookout shouted he had spotted dive bombers attacking Kaga from overhead. Despite being thrown into a hard turn, Kaga was struck by a 500 lb bomb and then successive strikes utterly crushed her…

At 1024 Soryu was struck a mighty series of blows…

At 1026, LT Dick Best led a flight of two other SBDs away from Kaga in an attack on Akagi. Attacking in a “V” formation from a right-hand turn, history held its breath as the first bomb missed and the third narrowly missed the carrier. But the second bomb, a 1,000 pounder from LT Best’s aircraft bore through the aft edge of the elevator and exploded in the upper reaches of the Akagi’s hangar bay, in the midst of the refueled/rearming aircraft parked there. In the blink of an eye, fate turned and three carriers lay burning.

To be sure the battle was not over and a dreadful price remained to be extracted from the American carriers. Likewise, Kido Butai had not seen the last of the Americans either and would pay the final price later in that day.

Across a seaborne canvass that stretched over 176,000 sq nm, larger than the country of Sweden, the battle see-sawed back and forth. No other naval engagement has seen such breath-taking distances involved and few, short of a Trafalgar, have seen such a decisive turn of events. We honor today those who fought and gave their all in this signatory battle.”

Across the expanses of the Pacific that now marked the final resting spot of four of the Combined Fleet’s carriers and another of the dwindling American fleet; across those waters whose perceived placidity formed the basis of its, by now, ironically given name, men on both sides gathered to ponder, to plan, to act.  On one side, it was a two pronged effort to hide the shame of the recent losses from the divine being occupying the throne while still trying to consolidate the spoils of what, six months previously, seemed to be an unstoppable force.  In the east, in the capitol of a nation roughly a century and a half removed from the shackles of an empire,  men, civilian and military paused in their brief celebration of the previous day’s events and turned over a question common in mind – ‘now what’?  The unexpected opportunity presented at Midway opened new avenues and forced thought about where emphasis should lie in the war effort.  Europe first?  That’s where the President’s heart lay and Churchill and Stalin were in desperate straits against the Nazi foe despite recent setbacks… Put the Pacific on ice now that Japan’s eastward and southern thrusts have been blunted?  Or take advantage of the change in strategic conditions?  Was it time to press Nimitz’s central Pacific strategy?  And what about MacArthur ?  Couldn’t keep him quiet in Australia forever.

In June 1942, a Japanese seaplane base commander was surveying the areas in a chain of volcanic- and coral-reef islands that stretched across the north-eastern approaches to Australia – the Solomon Islands.  While loitering about one, he noticed a wide, flat plain – perfect for constructing a long runway for land-based patrol bombers to extend their reach over land and sea.  And so, acting on his initiative, construction began on this heretofore, little noticed, overgrown outcropping of rock, stuck like an appendix to this chain of islands.

This rock named Guadalcanal.

In doing so, he touched off a series of events, of battles great and small, nation against nation, man against the elements – even man against himself that no one in those far-distant capitols had reckoned for.

Beginning here (and here  )  next week, we will bring you the story of the Solomons campaign.  A cast of writers have been assembled from a variety of communities  – some well known from their own blog efforts, some new to the blog ‘verse but well experienced in the ‘real world,’ others  you have only seen in the comments.  All will bring their knowledge and perspective to elements of the Campaign in the tradition established by the Countdown to Midway series.  In the process, while hoping to shed new light on a campaign that, with a few exceptions, has pretty much remained elusively darkened to most except for the dedicated naval and military historian, we also hope to highlight lessons for the current age – lessons form an operational, planning and leadership perspective.

For what is the good in studying history if we may not find the practical application in the present and for our future?

- SJS

Any of us who have spent a fair amount of time at sea become acquainted with the full cycle of life — from the births at home to the passings at sea.  For those of us in aviation, that environment afforded more opportunities for the latter, sometimes, unfortunately, exceptionally so.  My first encounter was when a young LT in one of our A-7 squadrons in CVW-7 was lost at sea after his jet slid off the deck in the North Atlantic.

Sat with him for the brief and come back next recovery to find he was no more.

That was the first of what became a long line of memorials in the foc’sl or on the flightdeck.  Not long thereafter, during a Mediterranean deployment our COD was lost with all hands when it flew into a mountainside in IMC weather in the east Med.   Great tragedy that was with departed pax heading home to shore duty after surviving the bulk of the deployment.  However, it wasn’t until another ship, another squadron and air wing some years later that that procession grew especially long and underscored the violent nature of our business and the frailty of our existence.  It began with an overdue S-3 that never returned from a night mission, a Marine A-6 lost a couple of days later when it flew into the sea checking out potential wreckage, another A-6 (same squadron) lost with both pilot and B/N  later in deployment on a Case III recovery or my roommate who was for all intents and purposes dead (later revived but permanently incapacitated) in an auto accident while returning from pre-exercise planning in England.  We also lost an F-14 but regained the crew and the Whale det that was deployed the first half of our deployment would be the one that had the barrier crash on Nimitz  with loss of all onboard later.  In each case, the naval services (for we had Marines deployed with us on those several occasions) brought forth the best of their sea-going traditions.

For it’s like this — we all work in one persuasion or another. And we each honor and appreciate one another’s company and efforts to varying degrees.

But when you go to sea, there is a special bond that is developed through shared adversity and an understanding of the importance of the ship you share versus the timeworn elements of the sea.  So, when a shipmate passes, one desires to honor them in a special way.

And when it is a CMC, in this case, CVW-7’s CMC  , it is especially noteworthy:

From fellow CPOs:

From the embarked airwing and ship's company:

To ships in the battlegroup:

Battlegroup Flag to Seaman Deuce; Brownshoe, Blackshoe -- Officer, Chief, Sailor - Everyone pausing in their comings and goings to give their due to a departed shipmate:

...and that, shipmates, is respect.

Rest easy Master Chief - rest in peace. Your shipmates have the watch.

(h/t to Byron’s CPO Son-in-Law & a former DDG/CG CO for the pics)

Setting the stage for the Solomon Islands Campaign project which kicks off next month…and what better way than with the classic, Victory at Sea:

In a nutshell:

• Nuclear Deterrence mission: “Back-to-basics”, increase by 2,000 number of nuclear support personel, add a 4th B-52 sqdn
• TACAIR: Accelerate retirement of 254 F-15, F-16 and A-10 a/c, validate remaining service life of residual legacy TACAIR a/c
• Space: Field new satellites including the Global Positioning Satellite Block IIF, Advanced Extremely High Frequency (AEHF), and Space Based Surveillance System (SBSS)
• Cyber-warfare: Standing-up Twenty Fourth Air Force (24AF) under Air Force Space Command (AFSPC) to better develop and integratecyberspace capabilities into the joint cyberspace structure
• Unmanned Air Systems (UAS): FY10 PB continues major investments in unmanned aircraft to increase UAS Combat Air Patrols (CAPs) to reach goal of 50 CAPs by the end of FY11
• State-by-state breakdown of plus-ups/decreases – with a list of all Congressmen and Senators for the affected state.

See for yourself (yes, of course – it is in PPT…):

(which might also serve as a cautionary tale to those who decry ‘future warists’ – SJS)

Writing in today’s Japan Times Online  , columnist Michael Richardson raises several, hoary arguments as to the possible effectiveness of missile defense vs. massive retaliation as a form of deterrence vis-à-vis the DPRK’s l’enfant terrible and the latest brewing crisis on the Korean peninsula.  We say “hoary  ” because true to the definition, the arguments are the same tired arguments dragged out of the closet by those opposed to missile defense.  Our purpose here is to provide the facts that refute those arguments inform the debate at the same time.

1.  “… neither the interceptors in silos in Alaska and California, nor the THAAD batteries, have been tested in combat. Nor have the 32 standard missile interceptors aboard 18 U.S. Navy Aegis ballistic missile defense warships.”

Of course the missiles listed have not been “combat-tested” – and neither have the Minutemen missiles in their midwestern silos, yet we don’t hear of anyone discounting their deterrent capability because not a single one has been fired under real, operational conditions from those silos.  Yet there is a long and well-documented test record that would support a strong degree of confidence that the missiles will successfully launch guide and reach their targets when called upon.  Periodically, a missile is selected at random, pulled from the silo and the nuclear warhead removed and replaced by telemetry one that is identical to the war shot, save the physics package.  It is then transported to Vandenberg and launched, using a crew randomly drawn from the field for the test. This is the surety phase of testing a mature system, like the Minuteman.
In the developmental phase, where all three of the systems above are located (some, like the SM-3 further along than others like the THAAD), one builds a program of increasingly complex conditions and objectives.  At first, you just test the airframe – will it launch and stage as designed?  Then you step it up and add a kill vehicle and repeat.  Then a target is added – a simple one at first.  Does the kill vehicle separate from the booster, locate and guide on the target, ultimately intercepting it?  Are the mechanics sufficient to execute a kill as predicted?  Complexity is added – decoys, more targets in flight, and shots near the edge of engage-ability rather than in the heart of the envelope.  Along the way previously determined knowledge points are either met or not.  If not, the deficiencies are addressed, corrections made and re-tests conducted.  Eventually you end up testing in as nearly an operationally real environment as possible under the auspices of OSD’s Director of Operational Test and Evaluation.  In fact, one of the systems identified above, Aegis BMD has passed DOT&E testing.   THAAD has been tested against multiple targets and the GBI tests have taken place in a geographical context that mimics a shot into Alaska and will be tested in a more roust fashion on a larger range against a complex target.

2.  “In the last two years, the U.S. Missile Defense Agency, which is responsible for testing and integrating the ballistic missile shield, has reported eight significant flight test delays, four target failures out of 18 target launches, and one interceptor failure in flight.”

Nice cherry picking  .  Here’s the full story, available to everyone, warts and all, at www.mda.mi 0l:

Using the author’s “last two years” we will go from March 2007-March 2009 (latest fact sheet on MDA’s site):

• SM-3:
  • 26-Apr-07 FTM-11 Event 4 (successful)
  • 22-Jun-07 FTM-12 (successful)
  • 31-Aug-07 FTM-11a (successful)
  • 6-Nov-07 FTM-13* (dual intercept – both successful)
  • 17-Dec-07 JFTM-1 (successful)
  • 1-Nov-08 Pacific Blitz (One target was intercepted, another was missed; all interceptors were version Block I missiles that had exceeded their service; no Block I’s are operationally deployed)
  • 19-Nov-08 JFTM-2 (failed – interceptor flew normally until final seconds; cause not yet determined)
• SM-2 Blk4:
  • 5-Jun-08 FTM-14
  • 26-Mar-09 Stellar Daggers
  • Sea-based tally 2007-2009: 9 of 11 successful since Mar 07 (17 of 21 since the program began in 2002)
• Ground-Based Mid-Course Defense (GBI’s)
  • 25-May-07 FTG-03 (FTG-03 was a “no test” because the target malfunctioned after launch and interceptor was not launched)
  • 28-Sep-07 FTG-03a (successful)
  • 5-Dec-08 FTG-05 (successful)
  • GBI tally 2007-2009: 2 of 2 or 2 of 3 successful (depending on how one counts a failed target) – since the program began in 1999: 8 of 13 including 3 of 3 using operationally configured interceptors.
• THAAD:
  • 5-Apr-07 FTT-07 (successful)
  • 27-Oct-07 FTT-08 (successful)
  • 25-Jun-08 FTT-09 (successful)
  • 17-Sep-08 FTT-10 (No-test – target malfunctioned after launch)
  • 17-Mar-09 FTT-10A (successful)
  • THAAD tally 2007-2009: 4 for 4 successful (5 for 5 if you count FTT-06 in Jan 07 which was successful).  Since the current test program began in 2006 – 6 of 6 successful with 2 “no tests” because of target failures.

So let’s look at those numbers again – March 2007 to March 2009, dates of Mr. Richardson’s picking: 15 of 18 tests that ended in a successful intercept where the target was destroyed.  Paints a little different picture, eh?

A word about targets is necessary.  The threat range for the variety of interceptors to be tested against range from SRBMs to intercontinental – 300 km to over 7000km.  Unlike using old aircraft for drones, which typically are plentiful and generally reliable even in the late stages of life, target missiles for testing are usually former US battlefield missiles, like the Lance, specially constructed and instrumented targets that nearly mimic the threat (because after all, as cash-strapped as Kim is, North Korea isn’t likely to sell us a TD-2 to use as a target vehicle – and with more than 180 successful flights since 1993, ours have been a bit more successful…) and occasionally, actual threat missiles like the widely proliferated SCUD.  Unlike, say the QF-4 drone, some ballistic missile targets are restricted by international treaty, specifically the INF treaty   signed by the US and Russia which prohibits construction of ground-based ballistic missiles with ranges greater than 1000km and less than 5500km.  Specifically, Article VI, which states

1. Upon entry into force of this Treaty and thereafter, neither Party shall:
(a) produce or flight-test any intermediate-range missiles or produce any stages of such missiles or any launchers of such missiles; or
(b) produce, flight-test or launch any shorter-range missiles or produce any stages of such missiles or any launchers of such missiles.
2. Notwithstanding paragraph 1 of this Article, each Party shall have the right to produce a type of GLBM not limited by this Treaty which uses a stage which is outwardly similar to, but not interchangeable with, a stage of an existing type of intermediate-range GLBM having more than one stage, providing that that Party does not produce any other stage which is outwardly similar to, but not interchangeable with, any other stage of an existing type of intermediate-range GLBM.

So – in a nutshell those are just some of the challenges faced in just building the target missile, much less surrogate warheads and decoys.

3. “It is also far from certain whether U.S. rockets designed to shoot down longer-range missiles can distinguish between decoys and the real things.”

GBI tests were successful against countermeasures of increasing complexity in tests conducted from 1999-2002 (IFT-3, IFT-6, IFT-7, IFT-8, IFT-9) and as the BMDS matures, testing will continue to push the limits of system performance in modeling and simulation and increasingly complex flight tests – implementing a crawl, walk, run approach to testing.  For more see the latest publication listing all missile defense programs currently extant below:
2009 Missile Defense Agency Programs  

4.  “By the end of 2009, there are scheduled to be a total of 864 interceptors in the U.S.-led missile shield. However, the U.S. military calculates that there has been an increase of more than 1,200 additional ballistic missiles in the past five years, bringing the total outside the U.S., NATO, Russia and China to over 5,900. Short-range missiles (150-799 km) make up 93 percent of this total while medium-range missiles (800-2,399 km) comprise six percent.”

OK – on this we can agree.  Ballistic missiles have been a growth industry since the end of the Cold War.  And at present, the greatest threat is to our deployed forces and the homelands of our friends, allies and partners in many regions across the globe, but especially in the Middle and Far East. In fact, here is the latest NASIC publication on the foreign missile threat:

Foreign Ballistic Missile Capabilities  

So – yes, our interceptor numbers lag the threat but the FY2010 budget significantly ramps up SM-3 and THAAD production (almost doubling original procurement numbers) and as most any air/missile defense planner will tell you, active defenses are but one of three legs of missile defense — the other two being passive defense (like dispersal, deception, and hardening) and offensive operations (e.g., disruption of C2 circuits by cyber attack, SCUD-busting, etc.).

5.  “Ultimately, the only deterrent likely to prevent Pyongyang using missiles armed with weapons of mass destruction is the knowledge that the counter-strike from the U.S. and its Asian allies would annihilate the North Korean regime.”

I’ve always found it curious that the most ardent opponents to missile defense are blind to the conundrum they construct by the all-or-nothing approach of relying on massive retaliation as a deterrent.  Missile defense is but one piece in a larger program of deterrence aimed at a broad range of threats.  The lack of missile defense plays into the hands of those who would employ the concept of minimal deterrence and gain an upper hand in escalation dominance  .  Consider the above again – suppose North Korea in some final Götterdämmerung-esque lashing out launches the handful of WMD armed missiles it could have in the near future at South Korea, Japan and say, Hawaii or even LA.  Please explain how it is in someway better that we have no means to intercept those missiles and instead turn the North into a smoking, radiating ruin after thirty minutes – with all the tragedy of consequence management from both strikes?  And suppose it is just a single launch against LA, or San Diego if the LA-ites among us are feeling a bit paranoid, do South Korea and Japan attempt to dissuade the US from either a massive or even “proportional” nuclear response because of those self-same fears of long-term effects of fallout in the region?  Surely China would have something to say about that too.

It seems to make sense to have all the tools necessary to handle the wide range of threats across the spectrum and missile defense – credible, effective theater, regional and global ballistic missile defenses are just such an effective tool in a range of options to be employed to prevent or when necessary, win war…

Preventing war is preferable to fighting wars . . . Maritime ballistic missile defense will enhance deterrence by providing an umbrella of protection to forward-deployed forces and friends and allies, while contributing to the larger architecture planned for defense of the United States.

– A Cooperative Strategy for 21st Century Seapower, October 2007

“When all else fails—when all the negotiations have broken down, when there is a missile in the air—you have to have the ability to destroy it, because the only other ability that you would have would be to apologize to those that have died.”

– Lieutenant General Henry ‘Trey’ Obering, USAF (retired)

And so here we are, on the cusp of the 40th anniversary of the first landing on the Moon – where have we come in those forty years?  As a star-crossed (literally) youth in 1969, my imagination was fired by the likes of the space program.  From Sheppard’s sub-orbital flight that I recall watching from our small black and white TV, all the Mercury and Gemini flights, the unmanned flights to the Moon and Mars and then those stunning images from behind the Moon as for the first time Man’s eyes watched the homeworld rise from behind another body…  Then there was 2001 with its plot that confused but special effects that made travel in space seem – real.  It seemed a logical extension of where we were going with the impending landing in July of ‘69 and to a young midwestern lad with a penchant for aviation, science fiction and a gaze fixed firmly upward, so near and attainable…

*sigh*  Welcome again to the Age of Diminished Expectations  …

Well, today the LRO (Lunar Reconnaissance Orbiter) 5 entered lunar orbit – reprising the recce missions (albeit HD this time) conducted by 5 Lunar Orbiter missions 0 between 1966 and 1967 preparatory to Apollo’s mission to the moon. (ironically, the Lunar Orbiter was launched by an Atlas-Agena D   SLV — and today’s LRO was launched by an Atlas-Centaur V  , albeit much more advanced and powerful to be sure than its distant cousin form the 60’s, but again, one would have thought by now we’d be much further along in SLV capability too…)  The current mission is part of the Apollo-on-steroids 2 return to the Moon program that *might* put us back on the moon by…2020??  (ed. and if/if the current review  doesn’t kill it or delay it to a much later date – we’ll know at summer’s end – SJS).  Accompanying the LRO is the smaller LCROS (Lunar CRater and Observer Sensing Satellite) 2 which actually beat the LRO to the Moon.  LCROSS made a flyby enroute to an Earth orbit that will bring it back to an impact in the lunar southern polar region.  The resulting plume will be observed by a number of earth-bound and space-based sensors for expected traces of water.

Yet for all the necessary science that will come from the missions, there is not much in the way boldness that inspires and piques the innate explorer in us.  Why not a mission to an asteroid with the Constellation 1?  Get out of low Earth orbit, get out of lunar orbit and start exploring and working in the interplanetary space that we will have to traverse on the way to Mars?  Be bold in our declarations to explore space – let’s inspire a new generation of scientists, engineers and explorers, instead of MBAs and lawyers.  Let’s be a nation on the leading edge of space again and not one satisfied with “do overs.”

Til then, I suppose, some of us will just have to settle for exploring in name only 0. (yes, the scribe & extended family are in orbit tonight – literally).  Of course, if one is so inclined, it’s not too late for Mars:

The following remarks were presented by CNO at the Current Strategy Forum, hosted by the Naval War College, on 16 June 2009.  We are presenting them here, unedited or commented upon,  except for certain boldened passages that we feel require emphasis.  The comments section is open for your thoughts…  – SJS

It is really a terrific opportunity to come together with you and have a debate, a discourse, a discussion on something that is very, very important and that is the strategy that we, as a Navy and nation, have to pursue. I think in a way we call this the Current Strategy Forum, but often times when we come here to talk about these things, we don’t really focus on our current strategy that much, but we focus on the current challenges and then what the future strategy should be; so in a way, I think that it may be ‘the future strategy forum’ in years ahead. Don’t jump too quickly on that. We have to think about it.

But I would also say that it’s great to have so many young leaders in the audience here and then those that are connected in at the War College, because I believe that it will be the young leaders who are here and watching and thinking who will write the strategies of our future for our Navy and nation.

When I talk about strategy what I’m really talking about, and I’m going to just distill it down into simple Sailor terms: it’s how we use what we have or will have to achieve our national security objectives. That to me is what we should be thinking about. And I would also say that given the lectures and the panels that we’ve had so far this morning, that as we think abut the future strategy, and the current strategy and where we have to go to achieve our national security objectives, that we have to do so in the context of today’s fiscal environment and the near-term fiscal environment that we know will affect us and will factor into our strategic thinking. I believe that the public has to be part of the dialogue and discussion that we’re going to have. I think they should think about the risks and the opportunities for the world’s oceans, in particularly for our Navy and that the public should have the opportunity to influence that dialogue. And I also believe it’s important for current and future strategists to think about, to write down, and debate the thoughts that are going on here because it’s in the aftermath of sessions such as this that we get some great thought going.

And I would say that for me being here and spending as much time as I do is extraordinarily helpful. I put a great value, and I’m speaking now to the young officers who are in this audience- I put a great value on setting aside time to think. Because I will tell you as you move up through the ranks, time will become your most precious commodity and you have to set aside time; you have to think about things, because that’s what those you lead expect of you to have done. And this is a terrific opportunity for me to do just that. And for me, as we engage in the Quadrennial Defense Review- hearing the thoughts, hearing the questions, hearing the comments are very helpful to me. And I’d say it’s a nice way to break away from budget discussions which have become my life in recent years.

But point in fact, when you talk about strategy, when you talk about Quadrennial Defense Reviews, you cannot not talk about budgets because that’s how we implement our means and our policies for our future. I would say that the Quadrennial Defense Review that we are involved in today is, like last year’s budget, is a model process. It has had the personal attention of the Secretary of Defense.  Both the budget and the Quadrennial Defense Review, that I will refer to in the term of QDR, and what has been different, is that Secretary Gates as a standing Secretary of Defense, led us through that transition. The first time in a long time, if ever, that we did not upon a change of administration between parties also change the Secretary of Defense. His leadership and experience, his vast experience in government, and his willingness to hear all voices I believe resulted in a good effort in the 2010 budget and I’m very confident that the QDR will produce the types of results that are important for our Navy and for our nation.

What I would like to do now is just lay out my perspectives on the importance of the seas, the challenges that we face, the strategies that we have in place, and what we need to properly carry out that strategy. But most importantly as I said at the onset, I really look forward to your questions.

Why is the maritime domain or why are the seas important? For me, I sum it up in about three words: it’s about commerce, it’s about communication and it’s about resources. We’ve talked today, or some of the speakers have talked about the amount of commerce that moves on the seas and the waterways of the world. Ninety percent of global trade- it has increased about 60 percent faster than the world GDP over the last couple years- has altered that rate a little bit.

We talked about the communications that flow: about 95 percent of communications that move around the world; about $3.2 trillion in trade. We talk about cyberspace, that’s not where it moves- not on the lightning bolts that go from the earth to the satellites and back down again, those communications and that electronic trade that takes place moves across the floor of the ocean and I think that’s an important thing for us to keep in mind.

Sixty-five percent of the world’s oil; 35 percent of the world’s gas reserves are in the littorals- that band that’s right along the edge of the ocean. And I think as we look to the future we can’t forget that it’s in that same region where energy sources such as wind and tidal, and even energy produced from things like algae, will become more important to our future. And most importantly, the maritime domain affords us the opportunity and the ability to operate and to influence without infringing on anyone’s national sovereignty.

As I look at the world that we live in today and the world that our children will live in, clearly it is more interconnected than ever before. Time and pace of operations, essential elements of strategy, are going to be effected by how tightly connected we are, so time and pace will continue to compress and that will change the way that we’ll have to go about doing our business. But the interconnectedness I think we’ll find to be somewhat fragile and it will be easily disrupted in what I call our “disrupted world.” The world that I see in the future will be one of disorder that will take place from time to time. Disorder can be caused by things such as abrupt changes in the economic fortunes and as we’ve seen, disorder can be caused by teenage pirates- our old foes from the past who come around again and with which we are now engaged. Beyond that, I would say that we face military threats from across the spectrum and that no conflict anymore will easily be identified as low-end or high= end. Hybrid is going to be the word du jour and all of us need to be thinking about that.

We know that weapons systems are proliferating and they’re quite advanced. They range from ballistic missiles to submarines and little can be assumed to be low- end anymore. And if you consider what a political group did, Hezbollah, in attacking an Israeli warship and almost sinking it, that is how hard I think it would be to categorize capability and threats and natures of threats. And we also find that we’re using very high-end electronic attack capabilities to defeat terrorists as they plant radio controlled improvised explosive devices; so again, high- end and low- end come together to mix. And remote and nonexistent battlefields are gaining in prominence. Littoral areas I believe will become more important. Cyber, an area that we are about ready to plunge into in a new way, the undersea environment will be significant, and demographic pressures will continue to create situations, crisis and opportunities that we must be able to account for in the future. Urban populations in 2050 will be the same as the world population in 2004 and seven of the 10 largest cities are going to be near the coasts. Less developed regions will account for 98 percent of the expected world increase of people through 2050. There will be resource competition as demographic pressures come into bear.

And we often think as we think about resource competition- hydrocarbons, but it will be water. And it will be what I call protein stocks- fish. Where will countries go to get that? And it will also be a competition for arable land. There will be competition for energy resources that must figure into our thinking, not just in our strategic view outside of the Navy, but how do we as a Navy, develop alternative forms of energy and fuels for that which we do. Climate change is upon us and those changes will affect everything from weather pattern shifts to changes in ice caps which will affect everything from water densities and salinity to transit routes.

Our strategy today to account for these risks had its beginnings about two years ago. We refer to it, and I hope all of you have access to it, as the Cooperative Strategy for 21st Century Sea Power. It has garnered, I would say, favorable international acceptance, and that acceptance is reevaluated daily as the right strategy for our maritime forces. What are the elements of that? We believe that preventing wars is just as important as winning a war and prevention is done clearly through our ability to demonstrate strength, to influence, assure and deter, but it’s also done through engagement, meaningful engagement and humanitarian action. It is also based on global maritime partnerships working together for common interests especially in the area of maritime security. And in those global maritime partnerships is engagement with a purpose. Whenever I am in a discussion about engagement, I say, ‘an engagement for what?’ There has to be a purpose for what we are doing, for the effort that is going into it on the part of all parties, but also for the resources that we devote to it. There are some who would say that engagement is only done with things that are small, cheap and benign, where we can engage on an individual, personal basis; but I would submit that engagement is also there to assure and deter and that sometimes credible combat power is good engagement.

And I get down to, what is the right mix? There are some who would say a small patrol boat showing a small coastal navy how to conduct a fisheries patrol is the best form of engagement. But consider what we’ve done with our Africa Partnership Station where we’ve took a little bit of a larger ship, an amphibious ship, where we could still go off and work with that coastal nation but then we could ballast that ship down and we could pull their boats in and teach them how to repair and to maintain. Where we could have an international staff on board, young officers who will rise to the top of their navy, who are developing friendships and relationships that will last the next 15 or 20 years? And a capability large enough to where we can hold conferences and meetings, and mix with the various interagency groups in the countries where we operate. That to me covers a broad spectrum of engagement.

Other examples of global maritime partnerships are what we’re doing with counter-piracy operations off the coast of Somalia. A few years ago if you would’ve listed the number of countries that would be cooperating in the way that we are, I think some would be skeptical, but the level of cooperation has been extraordinary over the last year. Africa Partnership Station, which I already mentioned, is developing regional maritime capabilities and capacity without creating a permanent presence ashore. It’s all done off shore without any infringement on anyone’s sovereignty. And the ability through our global maritime partnerships to communicate. In the aftermath of the tragic Air France crash- that day I was on the phone with my French counterpart, my Brazilian counterpart- and as we speak there is an international effort to try to find the boxes that will perhaps tell us what the cause of that crash was. And a few weeks ago in the aftermath of an incident in the East China Sea with one of our surveillance ships, within 24- about 48 hours, I was on the phone with my Chinese counterpart and we talked for about an hour. And then shortly after that I was in China with him for my fourth visit there and my third substantive meeting with my counterpart, Vice Adm. Wu Sheng Li.

Our strategy still calls for what we call six core capabilities and what are they? To be forward, to be a global Navy- to be out in the areas where we can respond and where we can provide options for the commander in chief. Forty five percent of our ships are out and about, around the world, interacting and providing that opportunity for engagement. But engagement can also include the 14,000 Sailors that are on the ground in Iraq and Afghanistan. That’s more Sailors on the ground in the Middle East than I have at sea in the Middle East. Today we have about 10,000 Sailors on ships; about 14,000 Sailors on the ground performing a range of missions.

Deterrence is another core capability that we see. Deterrence not only in the form of our ballistic missile submarines that are a significant part of our nuclear triad, but deterrence can also be the 97,000 tons of a U.S. aircraft carrier. And by the way, four of those aircraft carriers, four of our 11 aircraft carriers, are underway today. Three deployed in the Pacific and one in the Middle East and by the way, there are others in the pipeline to go and relieve them when the time comes.

Sea control- I think that one of the biggest challenges that we will have in the future is being able to exercise sea control wherever and whenever we will be ordered to do so against some of these proliferating threats, whether it’s advanced anti-ship cruise missiles, ballistic missiles, or the growth in submarines where the predictions are to see the global inventory of submarines increase by 280 in the next two decades.  And if anyone looks at our shipbuilding plan, we’re not that much of a contributor to that growth.

Power projection- it’s not just the images of Tomahawks going in to Iraq in the opening days of the war there but it’s also power projections such as what we’re doing in Afghanistan- where our aircraft carrier that is off the coast is providing 46 percent of the fixed wing aviation over Afghanistan. But it’s also the ability to project power and influence with our Marines from the decks of our amphibious ships.

And maritime security- I’ve already mentioned counter-piracy, they’re an example but so are operations that deal with stopping the theft of oil, that deal in countering some of the other transnational criminal activity of smuggling people, weapons and drugs and also the work that we do with friends and partners in the proliferation security initiative.

And new to the strategy is proactive humanitarian assistance and disaster response- not just reactive as we saw in the tsunami of 2004, which was the largest humanitarian relief operation ever conducted, but it’s also in the proactive work that continues to go on with our hospital ships and other ships. In fact since the first proactive hospital ship deployment in 2006, 409,000 patients have been treated from Navy ships operating with other services, other countries and nongovernmental organizations. That has an impact.

Intimately connected with any strategy that we develop is planning how to employ our limited resources in that strategy. And what weighs most heavily in my conversations, in my thinking and my work is planning not just for capability, but really coming to grips with capacity. One ship can only be in one place at one time. We are the smallest Navy that we have been since 1916, but our responsibilities are global and our interests will continue to require a global presence.

Another important planning factor of course does remain capability, especially the capability to account for the trends that we see. Surely, credible combat power is required but we must provide the right types of capabilities to the commander in chief. We continue to see growing demands from our combatant commanders for more ballistic missile defense, more submarines and clearly more intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance. And what we have seen is that the high-end capabilities have a better chance of going low and the low-end capabilities have a better chance of going high.

Multipurpose ships come into play when you have capacity issues. They can win the battle but they can also perform many other functions. For example, consider the Arleigh Burke guided missile destroyer. It was the platform from which the rescue of Captain Phillips of the Maersk Alabama took place. It was also a source of Tomahawk strikes into CENTCOM. It was also the ship that was selected to carry the first humanitarian supplies into Georgia after the conflict there because it could go in unattended. It’s also the ship that’s performing ballistic missile defense and long-range search and track in the Western Pacific. And it also is a ship that is currently operating on the East Coast of Africa in an Africa Partnership Station role. It does not mean that everything has to all be at the high end, but balance is the key.

I think as we go forward with our strategy, the one thing that we can never forget is that all the ships and airplanes and submarines that we have depend upon the young men and women who elect to put this uniform on and go forward and serve in our Navy. For the first time we have taken the all-volunteer force through a protracted conflict and I will also tell you that it is the best force; this is the best Navy today in which I have ever served. But operating and compensating that force takes on some very different considerations from in the past. We can no longer simply compel service, we have to be able to attract and we must be able to retain the fine men and women that serve and there’s a cost associated with that. Consider for example between 1990 and 1995, an E-5 in the United States Navy, a second class petty officer in the United States Navy, between ‘90 and ‘95, saw their pay increase $85. Fast forward to 2000-2005, that same second class petty officer in that same period of time saw their pay increase $11,000. The force we have today is a well compensated force. It is extraordinarily professional, but it is a force that we have to take into account manpower as we look into the future.

Our Sailors operationalize the maritime strategy and they must have the warfighting know-how to implement that strategy. They must have technical sophistication that they’re predecessors did not have. They must have language abilities to interact more globally. They must have some regional expertise or at least some understanding of the areas of the world where they were operating and they have to have cultural knowledge to do all the strategy envisions in this complex, in this connected and in this disordered world in which we will live.

So that’s my opening volley as to why I believe the ocean’s are important, what trends that may be out there and the maritime strategy that we have put in place to account for those trends and some of the planning factors that must be part of our future thinking.

And with that I look forward to your lively questions on any topic. The floor is open. Thank you.