Prelude for Round II of the discussions on the Maritime Strategy.
The document below from the Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments will provide the departure point for said discussions beginning 31 March here and over at several of the usual suspects: Information Dissemination, CDR Salamander, OP-FOR.com, Chapomatic, Eagle1 to name but a few. Since the release of the new MS in Oct ’07 there has been a great deal of focus and discussion on the downward link(s) into force structure and while those are important and vital discussions, an important element has been missing. Namely the larger discussion of whether this document genuinely constitutes a maritime strategy and if so (or if not) how it relates and interacts to the family of other strategy and policy documents. For example, as we pointed out on these pages in an earlier post, there appears to be a disconnect in the discussion on deterrence.
Many readers (hopefully) will recall that we opened these venues to Guest Authorship by the Navy lead of the MS in the days following the release of the MS to address questions, concerns and the like from around the ‘verse. We offer the same bully pulpit this time ’round as well. Your voice, your words edited only for spelling or other gross grammatical errors. Additionally, to stimulate the discussion, we offer the pulpit to those who want to expound beyond the limits of the comments section – a useful proposition for some who have encountered the cutoff before (*cough* b2 *cough*). Just submit your inputs via email to steeljawscribeATgmailDOTcom (you know what to change) and we will publish them under the Guest Author label with your preferred nome de’guerre. Our only request is as you review the article and the MS that it be less about the raw numbers of force structure and more in the context of the larger question of our national strategy and naval strategy in general and whow does it square with the three functions id’d by Work & Tol:
1. Inform and guide those American fighting men and women who make their professional living by operating on, over, under, and from the sea;
2. Be welcomed by US political leaders and representatives of the American people who will then seek and approve the funds necessary to implement the three Sea Services’ strategy (above those that might otherwise be expected); and
3. Be accepted, if not outright applauded and supported, by US naval allies.
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We look forward to the coming discussion on these and the other sites in the days/weeks to come.
Article Series - Maritime Strategy-II
- A Cooperative Strategy For 21st Century Seapower: An Assessment
- India Presses Homegrown Missile Defense
- Blogger’s Roundtable With VADM Morgan: The Maritime Strategy (UPDATED)
- Thoughts on the Maritime Strategy: Round II
- The Maritime Strategy, Deterrence & Escalation Dominance
- Sea-based BMD and the Maritime Strategy
- Implementing the Maritime Strategy: Integrated Missile Defense from the Sea
- Strategy Documents
- Maritime BMD Comes to the East Coast
- Naval Operations Concept (NOC) To Be Released Oct 08
- Everything You’ve Always Wanted to Know About the 80′s Maritime Strategy*
- Fixing the Nautical Pax Americana
- China’s Military Power – 2009 Report
- BMD From the Sea – It’s Not Just for SWO’s
- CNO’s Remarks at NWC Current Strategy Forum
- ‘A Cooperative Strategy for 21st Century Seapower’ Two Years Later: Three Questions
- SECDEF and the Doctrine of Sufficiency
- The Naval Operations Concept 2010 — Implementing the Maritime Strategy
- Competition in the South China Sea
- Linking the South China Sea and the Arctic Ocean