Implementing the Maritime Strategy: Quantity vs Quality

Quantity vs. Quality – how much is enough? It is a question as old as the first armies. Of late, it is one of the central questions in the implementation of the Maritime Strategy when it comes to the question of force structure and what the Navy (to be) will look like.

We recently attended a symposium hosted by a local Federally Funded Research and Development Center wherein the theme was focused on the challenges of implementing the MS. While discussion ranged across several topics, this particular meme was raised during the course of a working lunch whose approach to the subject tended to the quality side of the equation. The crux of the argument was that in a time of constrained budgets, it was better to build smaller classes of technologically advanced (or advancing) vessels, thereby keeping the industrial base primed, than expending it preserving outdated force structure. We would note that it came in response to a question about the apparent disconnect stemming from (a) public fretting over a decline in numbers of hulls in the water while (b) striving mightily to put hulls with life still in them, underwater as reefs and the like.

So what was the justification? Using historical illustration, the speaker attempted to make the case that the Navy of the 1920’s and 30’s, made the choice of technological advancement at the price of preservation of force structure (as opposed to the Army) and in so doing, embarked on construction of a series of warship classes that were small in number, but showed technological progress over preceding classes such that when war did come in the 1940’s, the ships and subs that ended up filling Tokyo Bay in 1945 (and we would add, the planes in the air – SJS) were either on the drawing boards or in the early stages of construction on 7 Dec 1942. In other words, the Navy was ready to fight a technologically advanced war when it presented itself in 1942 (more on that later). Guiding and directing the process were the design boards which ensured the vessels built in disparate shipyards held commonality across classes and tended not to suffer from the vagaries of the current PEO shipbuilding bureaucracy. Contrast that with the Army which sought during the same time frame to preserve force structure and found itself seriously under armed and outmatched at war’s outbreak. A final point was asserted that if we (as a nation) had made a decision to stick with merely preserving quantity, then Desert Storm would have been fought with M60 Patton’s instead of M1’s (minor point – the Marines were there with M60s…-SJS)

Well, while it provides a nice, albeit one-dimensional illustration, there are some problems with this historical allegory. One may start with the fact that at the onset the Navy wasn’t ready for a battle with an enemy which held both quantitative superiority and qualitative edges in several critical areas. Nevertheless, and as we illustrated in the “Countdown to Midway” series the initial turning point came primarily via a third set of factors that could be labeled tactics, training and command. Superior damage control, exploitation of COMINT, better tactics as exemplified by the Navy dive bomber tactics, and a command structure that allowed the commanders in the field to employ the concept of calculated risk and adapt to and exploit changing circumstances.

So what is different today, or more importantly, five or so years hence when facing a peer/near peer competitor? To be sure, the importance of competency in tactics, training and command will be vital in the opening moments of any engagement – no time for OJT. However, one cannot ignore the fact that numbers will come into play and for all the talk of non-kinetic effects and tactics, at some point it will come to matter on matter. And this is the point we’d like to open the floor to discussion. Is quantity its own quality? What if that quantity is outflanked by a significant shift in tactics and/or weaponry – recall the havoc caused by Japanese night surface tactics combined with the Long Lance torpedo. Turning the coin, the same caveat may be applied to the quality argument. Again, drawing on the historical allegory recall that radar equipped destroyers were present at the Battle of Savo Island. Most will argue that radar is a qualitative improvement and yet Allied forces were soundly routed by Japanese surface forces in that night engagement. Tactics, training, command… What about stealth? Does the whole force need stealth – or perhaps only a small unit of very LO (low observable) vessels that could be employed in a manner like the F-117 was in relation to conventional attack aircraft.  NAVAIR is rapidly running up on this very question — continue with development of the F-35C or perhaps another iteration of the Super Hornet that improves its frontal aspect LO while leaping a generation to a 6th generation aircraft in the 2025 time frame

So weigh in – let’s hear what you have to say, quantity? Quality? Hi-lo mix?  if so, what kind of mix?  Step on up to the mike…