Perspectives on Aegis BMD and Shooting Down a Failed Satellite

UPDATE: 20 Feb (21 Feb UTC) MARK INDIA – all indications intercept successful.  More to follow…

In the 24 hours since the press conference announcing the decision to use a special modification of the Aegis BMD/SM-3 system to mitigate risk from the failed NRO satellite, reaction across the ‘verse (net) has been, well, predictable:

“It’s really an attempt to protect super secret spy gear from falling into hostile hands”
“It’s really an ASAT test”
“It’s to show the (Chinese) (Russians) (fill-in-the-blank) who’s boss”
“It’s (MDA’s) (Navy’s) naked attempt to show off its wares for more funding”

And, of course, there is the expected Greek chorus from those opposed to any form of missile defense and take any opportunity to campaign against it.

So, let’s review the bidding.

The Problem 

US 193, by all accounts, appears to be the object of concern. Launched in December 2006, this presumed next generation intelligence collection satellite failed shortly after being placed in orbit by its Delta SLV. Failed in the sense that all communications with the satellite were lost and it apparently failed to deploy its solar panels and main sensor arrays. The problem then became one of not if but when it was going to return to Earth and if so, where and what the consequences would be. Consequences because embedded in the structure of the satellite is a tank containing over 1,000lbs of hydrazine propellant. While there are no open source photos of US 193, there are of the Lacrosse radar series to give a sense of scale and construct. Image 1 below is a drawing of one of the latter Lacrosse series – note the extended frame around the central core which would include the propellant tanks, and the size of the solar panels and antenna array.

Image 2 is a photo of the earliest Lacrosse’s main body structure. Again, note the size compared to the seated figure in the foreground.

The propellant tanks, smaller in this platform, are in the section to the viewer’s far left. In US 193, the tank has been referenced in size to a school bus.

Why is this background important?

As violent as reentry can be, things can survive, intact to impact earth and present a hazard. The image above is one of the hydrazine tanks that survived the break-up of STS Columbia. To be sure there are several differences at work – chief being that Columbia was designed to survive re-entry and even in break-up, that structural make-up mitigated some destructive action. Also since it came at the end of a mission most of the hydrazine had been expended. Still, construction of the tank both here and in US 193 would lend itself to surviving reentry, especially with the latter having been essentially in deep freeze for the past year.

Consequence Management

Space-faring nations have an obligation to minimize the impact of their operations on the nations that lay below. This is especially true where hazardous payloads are concerned. In 1978, one of the most egregious examples of failure to do so occurred when the reactor core of Cosmos 954, a radar-ocean surveillance satellite (RORSAT) operated by the then-Soviet Union, failed to separate on command and enter a higher/storage orbit at the end of life of the satellite. Instead, the entire satellite re-entered the atmosphere and spread nuclear waste from the reactor core – 110 lbs of U235 with a half-life of over 713 million years, across an area of over 48,000 square nm. More typically the re-entry is a controlled one and targeted for a remote ocean area, as was the case with the recently de-orbited Progress cargo module from the ISS.

But a controlled de-orbit is possible only if communications are held with the subject vehicle, and such is not the case with US 193. With a large hazmat payload that has a very large probability of surviving re-entry and a ground track that takes it over major population centers on all continents, options were sought for reducing the risk this object posed.

Usually, it’s about this time that Hollywood calls on Bruce Willis and a super secret, hail Mary program is unveiled that is the salvation of all. Well, that’s Hollywood and this is the real world. And even Doug Flutie well agree that Hail Mary passes have a low degree of probability of success. So you go with proven technology, practices and personnel in developing a CONOPS.

Your first decision is to decide if you do anything at all. See the first sentence in this section again. As a space faring nation we have an obligation to use any and all means at our disposal to lessen the effects of our actions on those who lay below. Imagine the outcry if this tank landed in or near a populated area with subsequent injury/death occurring from the payload and we had the means to at least try and lessen the odds of that happening and did nothing? One word folks – Katrina. Believe it or not, one has to think that was an unspoken factor in the decision to proceed.

Once the decision is made to proceed with an intercept option, the question is with what. For the last 7 plus years the US has been engaged in missile defense tests with a variety of land- and sea-based systems. The satellite, while on orbit, is nonetheless descending.

As such, it may be considered as a potentially re-entering ballistic missile for possible intercept scenarios. That last sentence glosses over an awful lot of modeling and simulation that must take place to enable this scenario. It also assumes robust tracking requirements. Because of the variables of the re-entry, the most flexibility for the shooter, especially from a positional advantage would be desired to ensure an intercept that would take place (1) as low as possible to the atmosphere to minimize persistence of on orbit debris and (2) ensure what debris that does survive breakup and reentry will form a debris field over a remote ocean area.

Process of elimination identifies the Aegis BMD/SM-3 system as best meeting the above, but the operational system is not configured for this mission. Used for the midcourse ascent/descent phase intercept of short- and medium-range ballistic missiles (SCUD and No Dong class respectively), the SM-3 BLK 1/BLK 1a series uses a kinetic energy, hit-to-kill warhead which has proven itself in several tests over the past five years (12 of 14 successful tests), each increasing in complexity. The supporting Aegis BMD system has been part of the NMD, providing long range surveillance and tracking for the ground based interceptors as well as providing engage capability in its later modifications for SM-3. Still, modifications to both the missile and BMD software would need to be made to effect this mission – modifications that are unique to this requirement and not supportable for normal operations. The ships and crews are already configured and trained in BMD operations, so the risk moderation here is building on proven technology, tactics, training and procedures.

The Questions

This is just an ASAT test (or alternately, designed to put China/Russia in their place or showcase MDA/Navy hardware)

No – for several reasons. First the missile itself, the SM-3, in its normal configuration is energy limited from an ASAT role. Recall again that mods had to be made to the SM-3 and the BMD software to meet this special mission requirement. Even then, the intercept is envisioned at about 200-225km altitude which is just above the upper reaches of the atmosphere. For reference, ISS is between 332 – 339 km and the Chinese ASAT test about 800km.

It’s just a cover for making sure sensitive spy equipment doesn’t fall into hostile hands.

In years past when the collection methods were primarily store and dump, that might have been the case. Today, with so much analysis and processing done off-board and in view of the stresses of re-entry on sensitive components, the likelihood of any exploitable material surviving to be recovered would be negligible.

Bottom-line

Perspective – this is a one shot deal (sometimes a cigar really is just a cigar). It no more represents an expansion of space-weapons capabilities or geopolitical intent than the NB-52’s launch of the X-15 imputed hypersonic cruise missile capabilities to the B-52 fleet. Recognize it for what it is, a serious attempt by a space faring nation using existing technology to mitigate risk of a hazardous object that presents challenging engineering, technical and operational issues to the professionals involved in the process. Let’s wish them bon chance and see what develops.


P.S.  Compare/contrast with the actions that took place before/during/after Cosmos 954’s re-entry in this CIA post-ex summary.

 

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11 Comments

  1. Great good stuff yet again, SJS. Thanks.

    Didja read what Crittenden had to say on the subject? I particularly liked his “just for fun” option… and you can’t deny it IS fun to solve a technical problem, especially one that involves blowing stuff up. 😉

  2. I was telling my roommate last night that it’s really too bad we don’t have an AEGIS equipped ship named “Enterprise.” I mean, this Captain and ship are going to have some pretty serious bragging rights…first vessel to shoot down a spaceship. (Never mind the details. 😉 )

  3. I think that you are downplaying the ASAT, and Spy tech angles of this is too much.

    While I don’t think those are the main factors, I do believe they may have played a direct, if not in-direct role in this decision.

    Don’t get me wrong, ANY one of those would be qualification enough for me to swat this thing out of orbit.

    But for you to say that they have no bearing in the decision, means that both statements below are false.

    The engineers from Raytheon must be totally geeked right now to get a shot at this thing.

    Almost everyone at the NRO is hoping US193 is pulverized into fine dust during this op.

    Truth is that it’s a WIN, WIN, WIN.

    The US can mitigate some risks associated with the hydrazine..
    Raytheon gets to expand on it’s SM3 capabilities, and can add some new data to the pool.
    The NRO gets a recon sat coming down in pieces instead of partially intact.

    ASW

  4. Space-faring nations have an obligation to minimize the impact of their operations on the nations that lay below. This is especially true where hazardous payloads are concerned.

    That, not some “geeked” out engineers at Raytheon or NRO drove the planning and decision-making process. Trying to impute an ASAT capability to SM-3 generates more headaches and problems than it is worth, from policy to tactics. And besides, since 1985 the policy of the USG has been decidedly against pursuing or maintaining an ASAT capability.

    Recall that from BOLD ORION through the F-15 ASAT program, the US has demonstrated and actually deployed an ASAT capability in years past (including an on-pad alert nuclear capability out of Kwajalein in the early 1960’s). Why would we suddenly feel the need to show a very limited ASAT capability in very low orbit against a satellite falling *out* of orbit in a very narrow set of circumstances using a one time, modification of a system that renders it tactically inoperable? To show we have an operable ASAT capability???

    There is no interest in developing an ASAT capability for SM-3 – there’s a bigger threat extant with the proliferation of SR- and MRBM’s that it is designed to go kill and real estate in the VLS is already hard enough to come by. As corny as this might sound, we are indeed doing this as part of our treaty obligations and responsibilities as a space-faring nation.
    -SJS

  5. Again, I am not saying that we do not have “good” intentions for this op.

    But for you to claim that our sole intention is to mitigate hydrazine pollution is weak at best.

    After all we let Skylab rain down over Australia without a thought, and Bold Orion was in its mature stages at that point in time as well as HI-Ho, Mudflap, and PMALS.

    Why not shoot Skylab down then?

    The SM-3 is not a true ASAT platform, I can agree with you there. But to think Raytheon’s software “geeks” do not want data acquisition for other platforms from this op is spurious at best.

    Again I will mention that I highly doubt that the NRO has raised any objections to a next gen sigint satellite coming down as confetti, as opposed to partially intact.

    You say that there will probably not be anything useful to obtained a partially intact sat, or that for some reason we relay down all intercepts from this sat with open comm.

    I can tell you that is a crock of crap. Give me ONE intact EPROM from that thing, and I should be able to reproduce some of the decryption algorithms the NRO uses. And if it just happens to be the right one, I can decrypt the entire US mil-comm spectrum.

    ASW

  6. Sorry brain faster than the fingers….

    should read……..

    You opine that there will probably not be anything useful to be obtained from a partially intact sat, or that for some reason we relay down all signal intercepts from this sat with open comm.

  7. 1. ob. off-board comms, I don’t think I inferred anything of the sort and we probably ought to stop the discussion at that point.
    2. I am pretty familiar with the planning and can say the focus has been and continues to be the hydrazine tank. If the rest ends up as confetti, sobeit and bonus.
    3. BOLD ORION’s last flight was in 1959 and had a near hit distance of 4 nm (would’ve required a nuke). HIGH VIRGO was a contemporary as well with similar results. HI-HOE (developed from the Navy’s SPace INtercept project) had one possible success, but mostly suffered a series of structural failures of the CALEB vehicle and never saw operational use. And the nuclear ASAT THOR was operational from September 1964 until December 1972. Skylab re-entered 11 June 1979. The ASM-135 ASAT (F-15 launched) didn’t have it’s first successful launch to a hit until 1985. So, unlike now, in 1979 there wasn’t anything, short of re-constituting a decom’d nuclear ASAT program or pulling a Hollywood stunt, to kill the Skylab.
    -SJS

  8. Mmm, lest one revel too much we know more than a few former and current brown shoes who were engaged in the operational and engineering aspects of this project… 😉
    -SJS

  9. True that … and since the real mark for success/failure was destruction of the hydrazine tank and that won’t be determined for another 24 to 48 hours while the data reduction continues… is it really a ‘Splash One’ then (he asks rhetorically) 😉
    -SJS

  10. Yep, the brown shoes and pale blue suits played very important supporting roles.
    But it very sweet for a former Black Shoe, to see that the 20 some year old AEGIS system is still kicking A__.

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