Perspectives on Aegis BMD and Shooting Down a Failed Satellite

UPDATE: 20 Feb (21 Feb UTC) MARK INDIA – all indications intercept successful.  More to follow…

In the 24 hours since the press conference announcing the decision to use a special modification of the Aegis BMD/SM-3 system to mitigate risk from the failed NRO satellite, reaction across the ‘verse (net) has been, well, predictable:

“It’s really an attempt to protect super secret spy gear from falling into hostile hands”
“It’s really an ASAT test”
“It’s to show the (Chinese) (Russians) (fill-in-the-blank) who’s boss”
“It’s (MDA’s) (Navy’s) naked attempt to show off its wares for more funding”

And, of course, there is the expected Greek chorus from those opposed to any form of missile defense and take any opportunity to campaign against it.

So, let’s review the bidding.

The Problem 

US 193, by all accounts, appears to be the object of concern. Launched in December 2006, this presumed next generation intelligence collection satellite failed shortly after being placed in orbit by its Delta SLV. Failed in the sense that all communications with the satellite were lost and it apparently failed to deploy its solar panels and main sensor arrays. The problem then became one of not if but when it was going to return to Earth and if so, where and what the consequences would be. Consequences because embedded in the structure of the satellite is a tank containing over 1,000lbs of hydrazine propellant. While there are no open source photos of US 193, there are of the Lacrosse radar series to give a sense of scale and construct. Image 1 below is a drawing of one of the latter Lacrosse series – note the extended frame around the central core which would include the propellant tanks, and the size of the solar panels and antenna array.

Image 2 is a photo of the earliest Lacrosse’s main body structure. Again, note the size compared to the seated figure in the foreground.

The propellant tanks, smaller in this platform, are in the section to the viewer’s far left. In US 193, the tank has been referenced in size to a school bus.

Why is this background important?

Usually, it’s about this time that Hollywood calls on Bruce Willis and a super secret, hail Mary program is unveiled that is the salvation of all. Well, that’s Hollywood and this is the real world. And even Doug Flutie well agree that Hail Mary passes have a low degree of probability of success. So you go with proven technology, practices and personnel in developing a CONOPS.

Your first decision is to decide if you do anything at all. See the first sentence in this section again. As a space faring nation we have an obligation to use any and all means at our disposal to lessen the effects of our actions on those who lay below. Imagine the outcry if this tank landed in or near a populated area with subsequent injury/death occurring from the payload and we had the means to at least try and lessen the odds of that happening and did nothing? One word folks – Katrina. Believe it or not, one has to think that was an unspoken factor in the decision to proceed.

Once the decision is made to proceed with an intercept option, the question is with what. For the last 7 plus years the US has been engaged in missile defense tests with a variety of land- and sea-based systems. The satellite, while on orbit, is nonetheless descending.

As such, it may be considered as a potentially re-entering ballistic missile for possible intercept scenarios. That last sentence glosses over an awful lot of modeling and simulation that must take place to enable this scenario. It also assumes robust tracking requirements. Because of the variables of the re-entry, the most flexibility for the shooter, especially from a positional advantage would be desired to ensure an intercept that would take place (1) as low as possible to the atmosphere to minimize persistence of on orbit debris and (2) ensure what debris that does survive breakup and reentry will form a debris field over a remote ocean area.

Process of elimination identifies the Aegis BMD/SM-3 system as best meeting the above, but the operational system is not configured for this mission. Used for the midcourse ascent/descent phase intercept of short- and medium-range ballistic missiles (SCUD and No Dong class respectively), the SM-3 BLK 1/BLK 1a series uses a kinetic energy, hit-to-kill warhead which has proven itself in several tests over the past five years (12 of 14 successful tests), each increasing in complexity. The supporting Aegis BMD system has been part of the NMD, providing long range surveillance and tracking for the ground based interceptors as well as providing engage capability in its later modifications for SM-3. Still, modifications to both the missile and BMD software would need to be made to effect this mission – modifications that are unique to this requirement and not supportable for normal operations. The ships and crews are already configured and trained in BMD operations, so the risk moderation here is building on proven technology, tactics, training and procedures.

The Questions

This is just an ASAT test (or alternately, designed to put China/Russia in their place or showcase MDA/Navy hardware)

No – for several reasons. First the missile itself, the SM-3, in its normal configuration is energy limited from an ASAT role. Recall again that mods had to be made to the SM-3 and the BMD software to meet this special mission requirement. Even then, the intercept is envisioned at about 200-225km altitude which is just above the upper reaches of the atmosphere. For reference, ISS is between 332 – 339 km and the Chinese ASAT test about 800km.

It’s just a cover for making sure sensitive spy equipment doesn’t fall into hostile hands.

In years past when the collection methods were primarily store and dump, that might have been the case. Today, with so much analysis and processing done off-board and in view of the stresses of re-entry on sensitive components, the likelihood of any exploitable material surviving to be recovered would be negligible.

Bottom-line

Perspective – this is a one shot deal (sometimes a cigar really is just a cigar). It no more represents an expansion of space-weapons capabilities or geopolitical intent than the NB-52’s launch of the X-15 imputed hypersonic cruise missile capabilities to the B-52 fleet. Recognize it for what it is, a serious attempt by a space faring nation using existing technology to mitigate risk of a hazardous object that presents challenging engineering, technical and operational issues to the professionals involved in the process. Let’s wish them bon chance and see what develops.

P.S.  Compare/contrast with the actions that took place before/during/after Cosmos 954’s re-entry in this CIA post-ex summary.