Nuclear Decisions (Part II)

(Nuclear Decisions, Part I – scene setters)

Following review of the current climate insofar as nuclear weapons policy/strategy was concerned (from the viewpoint of India), discussion turned to the course the nation should take.  One of the main points of concern turned on the topic of when a nuclear response was appropriate, particularly in the less certain environment of a post-chemical or -biological attack, a problem even a nuclear superpower like the US has wrestled with conflicting response.

Trends and Implications

Classical nuclear deterrence is the most relevant doctrine in India’s strategy of deterring peer states. However, with the probability of nuclear terrorism rising, it needs to be asked if India ought to undertake any doctrinal changes for deterrence against non-state actors? Is there any need for flexibility in India’s credible deterrent posture? India’s nuclear doctrine speaks of massive retaliation against any nuclear, chemical or biological attack but in case of a biological or chemical attack, would it be credible for India to resort to massive retaliation? Or should the doctrine prescribe a graded and proportional punitive retaliation. It is important for India to work towards dispersing its triad for a flexible response. (emphasis added)

Unlike the Cold War period, concepts of ‘deterrence’ and ‘denial’ are no longer mutually exclusive. They are in a state of co-habitation today. Unlike the US, India believes in the continuance of deterrence by punishment. Deterrence by denial is not feasible for India and has only a limited value. Further, there are limitations on India acquiring BMD capabilities as it involves huge expenditures. In the case of the US, the emphasis is on asymmetric threats, which is not the case with India. However, China is going in for missile defence and hence there has to be simultaneous research and development of offensive and defensive weapons by India.

This is a very illuminating passage.  It would appear that India believes they are on a nuclear tier wherein their chief competitors/threats (i.e., Pakistan though not named as such) are at a singular disadvantage qualitatively and quantitatively.  As such, there is not a corresponding level of mutual deterrence such as that which evolved between the US and the Soviet Union in the late 1960’s/early 1970’s.  Instead, they see themselves in a position of relative nuclear strength that would allow execution of retaliatory strikes with little fear of subsequent, disabling strikes.  Indeed, it almost would appear there might be a trend towards nuclear pre-emption.  Two questions, however, come to mind.  The first – what of China, who clearly has a superior inventory in terms of quantity and ability to deliver and second, what pressure might the US or Russia try to apply in either scenario (pre-emption or response) and how much leverage would either have?

The US is looking at leaner but meaner nuclear forces, alongside modernization of warheads and delivery systems. It is also looking for a responsive weapons infrastructure. India has smaller nuclear weapons compared to the West and if the taboo on nuclear use is broken, it will create new problems for Indian security. India must accord serious thought to its nuclear weapons infrastructure, especially because of its commitment to separating its military and civilian nuclear facilities in terms of the Indo-US nuclear deal. There must be clear emphasis on improvement in yield to weight ratio.

That last statement goes to the heart of the capabilities argument – by emphasizing improvement on yield to weight, one in turn, expands the number of platforms that are nuclear capable which has a dual-effect: on the one hand, it assures the survivability of your retaliatory force as you have more/varied platforms to disperse the weapons and means to deliver but on the other hand, it also expands your capacity, and potentially, predilection towards nuclear warfighting.  The US experience with tactical nukes in the 1950’s is germane.

On nuclear testing, the US position is that it has signed but not ratified the CTBT. Though the US has stated that there will be no testing of new warheads, it has not categorically ruled this out. Russia has already signed and ratified the CTBT, but has maintained that if others test, Moscow would follow. India has a voluntary moratorium on further testing but has not foreclosed that option since it has symbolic value and constitutes an insurance against future uncertainties.

Another trend involves nuclear cutbacks in the form of parallel, but unilateral, reductions, which also includes arsenal rationalization. Though the major powers do not require huge arsenals, they are keeping the option of reversibility. While this has no major implications for India, if it is a case of multilateral arms control, China will come into the picture, and India’s calculation of its own deterrent size and composition will be influenced.

Nuclear weapons are here to stay. India must take cognizance of this reality and ensure adequate measures for security. Substantial measures must be taken for conventional modernization to shore up the credibility of its nuclear deterrent. Above all, India must persevere in striving for a nuclear weapons free world.

 Clearly India must gingerly navigate the nuclear testing waters, politically as well as technically, to avoid jeopardizing the bi-lateral nuclear accord with the US.  Why?  Because the accord ratifies and legitimizes India’s status as a nuclear power outside of the NPT regime.  It is also clear from the above that India has learned another lesson well from observing the nuclear superpowers – that of making a general bow towards total disarmament (an increasingly unlikely event) while making the case for retaining and increasing their own nuclear holdings.

Up next – Part III: Planning and Force Structure

Shakti I thermonuclear device (1998)