Nuclear Decisions (Conclusion)

Part I

Part II 

So at this point, the Indian view might be summarized as follows: 

Nuclear weapons have emerged as the new means of ensuring security in the 21st century. They continue to play a cardinal role in the conduct of international relations and policies. The concept of nuclear deterrence has been revitalized by the US especially in the aftermath of 9/11. The world today is faced with threats ranging from individual acts of terrorism to nuclear threats. Hence, there is a need for a range of responses that include Special Forces. The efficacy of the concept of nuclear deterrence has also been appreciated by Russia, which chose nuclear deterrence over cooperative partnership with the West in the post-Cold War era. France has already cast its vote in favour of nuclear deterrence by clearly stating that nuclear weapons will continue to be the ultimate guarantor of French security. It believes in quick responsive nuclear forces that can decapitate a regime.

A cornerstone of nuclear deterrence is ensuring that your weapons will work when needed and on a consistent basis.  Testing – first in the atmosphere then underground to minimize fallout, is the most reliable means of determining reliability and effecting improvements to the weapons.  With the de facto adherence to the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) the US has sought to find other ways to include detonation of weapons with the physics packages removed, super-computer simulations and development of a new family of weapons under the Reliable Replacement Warhead (RRW) program.  All these efforts have generated interest on India’s part:

Nuclear Arsenals and Infrastructure

The US is investing millions for developing state-of-the-art weapons. Two such weapon structures are the RNEP and the RRW [reliable replacement warhead]. The US regards the RNEP as a militarily useful weapon intended to overcome its problems in a non-nuclear conflict. Currently, the Pentagon possesses 50 upgraded bunker busters known as B61-11. However, they can only penetrate up to 20 feet in dry soil. The target country could build its underground bunkers much deeper, thus reducing their vulnerability to a RNEP attack. Nuclear bunker busters, designed to be "usable" weapons, constitute a threat to the non-proliferation regime. RRWs will substantially undermine the international community’s ability to fight against proliferation. If the United States eventually proceeds with the RRW, it should do so only after ratifying the CTBT. That the RRW does not have much support within the US Congress was indicated by the reduced funding by Congress to complete RRW studies.

If this is the state of affairs on nuclear weapons thinking and strategies, is it feasible for India to abandon or neglect its nuclear deterrent? The underlying rationale for nuclear deterrence remains the same. India cannot afford complacency in building its nuclear deterrent capabilities. China’s current estimation and future projections have to be taken into account while planning for India’s nuclear deterrent. India’s nuclear strategy for combating terrorism differs from the global strategy in dealing with this problem through improved intelligence, export controls and more vigilance. Dr Sethi’s paper addresses the fact that India must pay attention to upgrading and modernizing its nuclear arsenal to address the uncertainties of the future while, at the same time, emphasizing that India adheres by a restrained nuclear policy. If, according to Dr Sethi, India’s nuclear threshold is raised to thwart any adventure by Pakistan, this will open a Pandora’s box of proliferation concerns. While a verifiable FMCT, UNSCR [UN Security Council Resolution] 1540, and no first use (NFU), seem to be favoured in India, the Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI) remains a matter of concern as it sidesteps international law, lacks UN backing and militates against the Convention on the Law of the Seas.

 So clearly, India intends to maintain a nuclear capability.  The question then that remains is what will be the size and composition of the force and will it be strictly retaliatory or incorporate defense and some modicum of war-fighting.  If the latter, then changes will have to be made to the force structure.  We begin with the question of defense, specifically ballistic missile defense.  Why?  Because work and demonstrated ABM capabilities by the US (primarily) have begun changing the way nations think about the possibility of real defense against a range of ballistic missile threats.

BMD

The concept of BMD has emerged because nuclear deterrence may not be the sole measure to combat exigencies and is gathering importance with new developments in Northeast Asia. Iran’s nuclear posture is also making several European states consider the BMD option with renewed interest. The US is working towards setting up 10 interceptors in Poland and a radar system in the Czech Republic for protection against Iran. This has created consternation in Russia, which is modernizing its defence force reportedly by developing three long-range missile systems. The UK and France are also considering the BMD option seriously after initial opposition. (emphasis added)

The standoff between the US and Russia over the BMD issue is a major area of concern. BMD in Eastern Europe was not designed against Russia but directed against North Korea and Iran. However, the Russians have taken serious exception to this and have considered setting up radars in the embassies of neighbouring countries. Russia is considering the possibility of using pre-emptive strikes with interceptors using nuclear warheads. Though Russia abandoned BMD initially because of its enormous costs, it appears to have restarted it now. (ed note: There is a bit of misunderstanding here in that Russia maintains the only strategic ABM system, the system permitted under the old ABM treaty, around Moscow.  This is a nuclear interceptor-based system and very much different from the non-nuclear kinetic kill-based system of systems the US is working on. – SJS)

With BMD increasingly a reality, the weapons systems or the launch platforms from where the nuclear warheads will be delivered or the way these are going to be transported will be entirely different. The weapons platforms that India has at present can achieve an accuracy of 10 metres and strike the target with a velocity, which is 8 to 9 times more than the normal velocity of weapons systems. This can ensure a degree of destruction of the target as much as nuclear weapons. Thus, deterrence by conventional weapons with higher accuracy and greater velocity will provide the same benefits as nuclear weapons. If these weapons are used against certain power projects, nuclear installations, or petroleum refineries it will produce much greater effect than nuclear weapons. There will thus be a greater usage of conventional weapons in future than ICBMs and IRBMs [intermediate-range ballistic missiles] that might be easily intercepted. (emphasis added)

There will be greater mobility of platforms because anything that is static will be detected and attacked. The problem of range can be overcome by getting closer to shorelines. Unlike the US, India need not go for longer ranges and can attack its targets with shorter range missiles. The future will belong to a weapon system, which is more powerful and lethal, is mobile and can mount both conventional and non-conventional weapons.

There is a conceptual problem in reconciling deterrence with BMD. The more effective the BMD, the more likely that the nation having this capability would acquire a first-strike-capability, that is, since it becomes invulnerable to a second strike, it assumes that it can launch a first strike. This was the dilemma of the Soviets in the 1980s. If nuclear weapons remain available to a few nations then others will think why they are being denied them. This was apparent during the recent Preparatory Conference for the 2010 NPT  [Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty] Review Conference in Geneva. The nonaligned and developing countries on the one side and the nuclear weapon countries on the other were deeply divided on their obligations under Article II and Article VI to the NPT.

Massive Retaliation

The usage of the word ‘massive’ instead of ‘punitive’ in India’s nuclear doctrine is debatable. However, the actual words relevant are ‘unacceptable damage’, which derives from a subjective analysis. Hence, the word ‘massive’ should be avoided.

Disarmament

India must work towards nuclear disarmament and a nuclear weapons-free world. Nuclear weapons could breed proliferation and constitute the greatest danger to the world. There is a contradiction in the assumption that India has to work towards pursuing a credible nuclear deterrence and also towards a nuclear weapons-free world.

Relevance of Nuclear Weapons

The question of relevance and utility of nuclear weapons has to be addressed. This will lead to the rationalization of India’s nuclear doctrine. As long as the existing reliance on nuclear weapons continues, India will have to continue with nuclear deterrence. Given this strategic context, India needs to build up its nuclear weapons arsenal.

India has major decisions laying in the near future – BMD, to pursue or not (apparently the answer is yes as they have begun tests); development of an ICBM (where range > 5,000 km)is another problematic issue.  On the one hand, there are matters of the utility of dual use technology where the process and technology used to develop an ICBM out of the AGNI MR/IRBM series is the same as for developing an indigenous space launch vehicle.  Additionally, there are potential targets in extreme northeast China that could only be reached from parts of India via an ICBM.  On the other hand, there is the antagonistic approach that such a development would likely produce in the capitols of Europe, Russia and the US over India’s intent in developing said weapon.  Regardless, India clearly intends to not only maintain her nuclear weapons, but seek a position at the nuclear table as a growing nuclear power with serious developmental potential, unlike say, Pakistan which possess nuclear weapons as well, but lacks the infrastructure to invoke much more than a one-dimensional threat.  To expect India to pull a South Africa and renounce its nuclear weapons program is unrealistic and it behooves the US and the other nuclear powers to accept the reality of India’s forces but at the same time, work to de-incentivize plans to grow those forces substantially beyond their current qualitative and quantitative capabilities.