Intramural Warfare – 2009 Budget Edition
The three maritime services get together and hammer out a strategic vision that ties them together, informing their future planning for training, equipping and manning. They show up in Congress, testify before the HASC (all three together for the first time) and are generally well received. Certainly not eviscerated like the CSAF who was told to go back and build a strategy/vision – like the maritime services had done, before coming back and telling Congress just what it was you intended to do with your request besides buying stuff. Chastened, they ask one of the maritime services to come brief them on the Maritime Strategy and their lessons learned in building it. In typical Beltway politics, where no good deed goes unpunished then, comes this little gem courtesy Sunday’s Washington Post:
Nonpermissive = Hostile; Zero-sum= "My gain, your loss, tough luck"; Peer competitor – usually reserved for likes of China, Russia…
Oh, and just to clarify for the CSAF’s Director of Communications – it was the Navy, Marines AND Coast Guard who developed the Maritime Strategy. Together.
Well, Hell. Give CSAF and his staff credit for one thing, at least. They’ve gone back to the old, venerable, tried-and-true Hap Arnold logo and not that !@&!!%% post-modern nutcracker thing of a logo they pawned off on USAF a couple of years ago.
Next step is to actually begin planning. (Or re-writing the Mission Statement.) That might come, and hopefully soon.
Talk about a tin ear. The basic idea of operating without any sort of strategy is bad enough, but then to add insult to injury by talking about the other services like they’re the enemy (although there’s probably more people than I’d like to admit in the USAF who feel that way), just not exactly the smartest life decision.
And this is supposedly the Director of Communications…Jesus Christ.
My particular beef is that this came on the heels of Navy coming over to help Air Force fix itself by walking them through the process of how the MS came to be and sharing the lessons learned. Navy could have very well have told AF to take a flying leap (and in light of the grief we endured from that side of the building during QDR’01, probably been justified in doing so)- but Mullen and Roughhead et al thought otherwise. The early returns? Ecce
It is abundantly clear no one in that office read, much less understood the MS. It’s not about claiming domains in a zero sum game – its about effective employment of maritime forces across a range of conditions and requirements, and developing the capabilities and force structure to do so. If they think its primary purpose is the justification of a 313 ship Navy, and plane to build a document with an end goal based on x-number of Raptor squadrons, then they seriously missed the boat and wasted the valuable time of a lot of people.
Noticed you mentioned that in the post, SJS. I had no idea that the USAF had asked the Navy for help. In light of that this is even worse. Also makes the whole lack of strategy situation even more pathetic given that apparently we still can’t grasp how a strategy and force requirements interact and, more importantly, which one comes first.
Forgot to add, one of the commenters over at Abu Muqawama had this to say about the situation…
“Here’s what the Air Force defines as a strategy:
1. In every conflict, you need air superiority.
2. To remain the sole superpower, we need to maintain a big nuclear arsenal.
It almost as if the USAF is researching its positions by playing Risk and Axis and Allies. (“Look, we need planes! And lots of them!”)”
My computer is lucky I wasn’t drinking anything when I read that…
Well, then they aren’t going to like what I’ve got to say in the near future re. #2 then either…